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8.1  Introduction 
After World War 11,  the United States became the major supplier of 
capital in world markets, and for many years that role appeared to be 
a permanent one. The United States’ recent swing to being the world’s 
largest borrower is a reminder that in this respect our history has been 
cyclical since the late nineteenth century, alternating between periods 
of capital exporting and capital importing. These swings were mainly 
based on economic circumstances, but at times wars and threats of 
wars, revolutions, and other types of  government instability made in- 
vestment flow uphill, against the pull of purely economic forces. 
A more constant feature than the direction of the capital flow has 
been the association of U.S. capital exports with the export of tech- 
nology and management. Americans were the innovators in exporting 
the package of management, technology, and capital, sometimes even 
without the capital, that is known  as foreign direct investment: the 
ownership of  production  facilities  in  one country by  firms  based in 
another country. 
The development of  this type of  multinational enterprise and the 
changes that have taken place  within  it reflect  the evolution of the 
competitiveness and comparative advantage of  American firms and 
their responses to changes in political  and economic circumstances. 
The innovation  represented by these U.S.  enterprises has been in- 
creasingly copied by firms based in other countries, with the result that 
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many foreign firms have entered the U.S. market, and multinational 
activity has become a feature of firms even from developing countries. 
Against the relatively  steady growth of direct investment, first out 
of the United States and then into it, there have been large swings in 
other  forms of investment. Most foreign investment in the United States 
has been  portfolio  rather than direct investment; that is,  it has not 
included foreign control of U.S.  enterprises. The United States too has 
engaged in brief, but very large, spurts in portfolio investing in foreign 
countries. These are important, despite their infrequency, because they 
have been so large, at times outrunning the steadier trends in direct 
investment. 
8.2  Historical Background 
8.2.1 
The recent metamorphosis  of the United  States into a large inter- 
national borrower has been unsettling. It has been an unfamiliar role 
for many decades, but it is not a totally new one. It is a return to the 
pattern of the United  States’ first century of existence. Most of the 
time, from George Washington’s inauguration until an abrupt turn to 
capital exporting at the end of the nineteenth century, the United States 
had been a net borrower in foreign financial markets (see table 8.1). 
The cumulation  of borrowing  year after year until  the end of the 
nineteenth  century meant that the  United  States was a  net debtor 
throughout  these years; it was still a net debtor at the beginning of 
World War I, despite fifteen or  twenty years in which the United States 
was a net foreign lender most of the time (see table 8.2). 
Foreign Investment in the United States before World War I 
Table 8.1  Net Inflow of Capital to the United States (millions of dollars, 
current prices) 
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, Series U 18-U  23. 477  U.S. Changing Patterns of  International Investment 
Table 8.2  Net Liabilities (-) of the United States, 1789-1914  (millions of 
dollars, current prices) 
From Compilation of 
Assets and Liabilities 
From Cumulation of 
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Sources: Cumulation of net capital flows from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, Series 
U 40. Compilation of assets and liabilities from Lewis 1938, 445. 
"After defaults of $50 million in  1816-19. 
bAfter defaults of $12 million in  1841 and  1842. 
An  indication of  the size of the debt relative to the U.S. economy 
is that the net indebtedness was about 3 percent of U.S. national wealth 
or  tangible assets (land, structures, equipment, and inventories) in 1900; 
the indebtedness of  1914 was a little over 2 percent of  national wealth 
in 1912. U.S. gross indebtedness in 1914, including foreign holdings of 
direct investment, was about 2.5 percent of total tangible and financial 
assets in the United States in 1912 (U.S. Bureau of  the Census 1975, 
Series F 377 and F 378). 
There are several ways to view the role of these flows of financial 
capital in  American development. One is as a source of financing for 
aggregate capital formation, permitting faster accumulation of capital 
than  would  have  taken  place  if  only  domestic  financing had  been 
available. On this basis, it is hard to suppose that imports of capital 
had a great influence on the rate of development, at least during most 
of  the  nineteenth  century. The capital  inflows never  reached  more 
than 1.5 percent of total output in any decade from the 1830s through 
the first ten years of  the twentieth century and were probably never 
more than 6 percent or possible 7 percent of  gross capital formation 
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Table 8.3  Net Inflow of Capital in 1860 Prices 
As Percent of 
Gross National 
Product 











































-  3.1 
-  1.8 
Source:  Edelstein 1982, 234, table 10.1, cols.  1 and 3 
In general, U.S. borrowing from foreign countries rose when  U.S. 
capital formation surged; borrowing tapered off as U.S. saving, rising 
more gradually and steadily, caught up with capital formation. Thus, 
investment from abroad accommodated the large spurts in the demand 
for capital that characterized the rapidly growing economy. 
There may have been other roles for borrowing from abroad. One 
might have been to supply funds for particularly risky forms of capital 
formation at a lower interest rate than would have been required by 
domestic lenders. Another might have been to supply funds when, in 
the face of heavy demands by rapidly growing sectors, U.S. domestic 
lenders’ needs for diversification of risks made them reluctant to offer 
sufficient financing to these sectors. Another interpretation is that U.S. 
railway and government securities, relatively  safe and requiring less 
local knowledge than investment in smaller-scale enterprises in agri- 
culture, mining, and manufacturing, tended to be sold overseas, while 
domestic suppliers of capital invested in the riskier, but more profitable, 
sectors (Edelstein 1982, 237-38). 
The bulk of  foreign investment in the United States was portfolio 
investment rather than direct investment (table 8.4). That is, it consisted 
of purchases of bonds or, to a small extent, equities that did not involve 
control over the enterprise receiving the capital. Just before World War 
I, about 80 percent of the stock of long-term foreign investment in the 
United  States was portfolio investment; the same had been true for 
the flow over a long period (Edelstein 1982, 36 and 37). Governments 
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Table 8.4  Composition of U.S. Liabilities, 1869-1914  (millions of dollars, 
current prices) 
I869  1897  1908  1914 
1,310 
1,390  3,145  6,000  { 5,440 
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Source: Lewis 1938, 442 and 445. 
in the form of  bonds rather than equities. Most of the foreign invest- 
ment, whether for governments or private companies, went to large, 
lumpy, social overhead capital projects, such as canals, railways, elec- 
trical utilities, and telephone and telegraph  systems (Edelstein 1982, 
39-41).  Manufacturing enterprises were probably almost all too small 
to seek foreign financing or even, in most cases, public financing from 
domestic sources. 
There were instances of manufacturing enterprises set up by foreign 
craftsmen or entrepreneurs with special knowledge or skill. However, 
in an era in  which transportation and communication  were slow by 
modern standards, these often involved the migration of the owners 
and eventual conversion of their enterprises  into domestic entitites. 
Thus, these enterprises involved mainly a flow of human capital to the 
United States. 
We  do not deal with the flow of human capital here, but it may have 
been more important to U.S. development than the flows of financial 
capital. In terms of numbers, immigration into the  United  States in 
each decade from the  1830s through  the beginning of  World  War  I 
ranged from about 5 percent to 10 percent of the number already in 
the country (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, Series A 6 and C 89). 
Furthermore, most of  the immigrants (a 50 percent larger proportion 
than in the population as a whole) were between fifteen and forty-four 
years of age (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, Series C 119, C 122-27, 
C 138, and C 141). They came to the United States with most of their 
rearing costs already incurred and with a large part of their working 
lives still ahead of them. 
8.2.2  The Beginnings of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 
The United States has been unique among the major investing coun- 
tries in that the principal form of its investment has been, from the 
earliest times recorded, direct rather than portfolio investment (table 
8.5). That is, it has typically involved control of  foreign operations 
rather than simply the lending of capital to foreign-controlled firms or 480  Robert E. LipseyJMario SchimbernVRobert V.  Lindsay 
Table 8.5  Stock of U.S. Investment Abroad, by Type (millions of  dollars, 
current prices) 










Source: Lewis 1938, 605. 
aNet of  repatriations  and repudiations. 
to governments. The earliest estimates, for 1897, show over 90 percent 
of U.S. investment to have been of this type. 
The earliest examples of  U.S.  direct investment took place while the 
United States was still, on net balance, an importer of capital. They 
illustrate the key role of the export of technology, or  other firm-specific 
assets, as contrasted to the pure export of capital, as is the case with 
portfolio investment. 
U.S. direct investment abroad, in the sense of production abroad by 
subsidiaries or branches of U.S. companies, began soon after the Civil 
War and involved companies “with national  sales plans and unique 
products” (Wilkins 1970, 35). Wilkins describes Singer, the manufac- 
turer of sewing machines, as “the first American international  busi- 
ness” (p. 37), with salaried sales representatives abroad in the early 
1860s and its first foreign factory by the late 1860s (p. 42). Other early 
American production abroad during the period when the United States 
was still a capital importer was done by Hoe (printing presses), Bab- 
cock and Wilcox (boilers), International Bell Telephone and Western 
Electric, Edison Electric, Thomson-Houston Electric, a component of 
General Electric when it was formed later, Westinghouse Air Brake, 
Kodak, McCormick, Worthington Pump, Chicago Pneumatic Tool, Otis 
Elevator, National Cash Register, and Libbey-Owens (Southard 193 1 ; 
Wilkins  1970, chap. 3).  These companies were typically early tech- 
nological leaders in their fields. Another indication of  the importance 
of  technology rather than capital is the number of instances in which 
the parent’s investment consisted entirely or largely of patent rights, 
as in  the case of  Ford  in  Canada,  Libbey-Owens  Glass in  various 
European countries, and Westinghouse Electric in the United Kingdom 
(Lewis 1938, 300-301). 
8.2.3  The Transformation of the U.S. International Balance Sheet, 
1914-19 
The beginning of World War I found the United  States still a sub- 
stantial international net debtor, but the events of the next few years 
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wartime lending by the United States, and especially the liquidation 
of foreign claims against the United States in the form of holdings of 
U.S.  securities,  this  country  ended the period  as a  net  creditor  in 
international markets (table 8.6).  The United States became a net cred- 
itor even on private account, aside from the intergovernment debt of 
almost  $10 billion that  was  to bedevil  international negotiations  on 
reparations and other topics through the interwar years. 
8.2.4  The United States as an International Investor, 1919-29 
The period of the 1920s, and particularly the late 1920s, was excep- 
tional in the history of U.S. investing abroad in two respects. One was 
that the growth of portfolio  investment was far greater than that of 
direct investment, to the extent that the stock of portfolio investment 
exceeded that of  direct investment for the first and only time at the 
end of  that period (table 8.7). The other was that, in the late  1920s, 
direct investment in foreign public utilities, which represented only 4 
percent of the stock of direct investment in  1924, accounted for over 
a third of the increase during the next five years (table 8.8). 
Almost the whole history of U.S. direct investment in foreign public 
utilities is concentrated in the few years between  1924 and 1929. The 
increase in the stock of public utility investment in these years was 
almost  80  percent  of  the  1929  total as compared with  less  than  30 
percent for all industries combined (table 8.9). The direct investment 
in foreign public utilities was very concentrated, both geographically 
and by company. The most detailed geographical breakdown, available 
only for  1940, probably reflects the distribution  in  1929 (table 8.10). 
Over 60 percent of the public utility investment was in Latin America, 
Table 8.6  The International Balance Sheet of the United States (millions of 
dollars, current prices) 
July  1,  1914  Dec. 31, 1919 
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Source: Lewis 1938, 447. Table 8.7  Value of  Stock of  Private Foreign Assets of the United States 
(millions of dollars, current prices) 
1924 minus  1929 minus 
Type of Investment  1919  1924  1929  1919  1924 
Direct  3,880  5,389  7,553  1,509  2,164 
Portfolio, incl. short term  3,076  5,365  9,456  2,289  4,091 
Total  6,957  10,754  17,010  3,797  6,256 
Source: Lewis 1938, 450 and 605. 
Table 8.8  Percentage Distribution by  Industry of the Value and the Growth 
in Value of  the Stock of  U.S. Direct Investment 
1929 minus 
1924  1929  1924 
Primary productiona  45.6  40.6  28.2 
Manufacturing  23.2  24.1  26.3 
Public utilities  4.2  13.6  37.0 
Distribution, incl. petroleumb  13.1  11.5  7.2 
Other 
Total 
13.9  10.3  1.3 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Lewis 1938, 450 and 605. 
"Agriculture, mining, and petroleum production. 
bSales and purchasing, including petroleum distribution. 
Table 8.9  Growth in Value of the Stock of U.S. Direct Investment, 1924-29, 
as Percentage of the 1929 Stock, by Industry 
1929 minus 1924 as 
Percent of 1929 
Primary production, excl. petroleum distribution  19.9 
Manufacturing  31.2 
Public utilities  78.2 
Distribution incl. petroleum distribution  18.1 
Other  3.5 
Total  28.7 
Source: Lewis 1938, 450 and 605. 483  U.S. Changing Patterns of International  Investment 
Table 8.10  Percentage Distribution (%) of  U.S. Direct Investment in Public 
Utilities 
1940 
Canada and Newfoundland  26.9 
Latin America  63.6 
Other  9.5 
Total  100.0 
Source:  Sammons  and Abelson 1942. 21. 
mainly  South  America,  far above that  area’s share in  total  direct 
investment. 
Portfolio investment, as well as direct investment, was concentrated 
in South America during the 1920s (table 8.11). More than a third of 
the growth in direct investment between  1924 and 1929 was in South 
America, the location of less than a fifth of  such investment in  1924, 
and over a quarter of the growth in portfolio investment was directed 
there in these years, although the initial  share was only  10 percent. 
Another way of describing the temporal concentration  of investment 
in South America is that almost half of the stock of direct investment 
and almost two-thirds of  the stock of portfolio investment  in South 
America in  1929 were accounted for by the growth between 1924 and 
1929 (table 8.12). 
Table 8.11  Percentage Distribution by  Geographical Area of the Value and 
the Growth in  Value of  U.S. Direct Investment 
1929 minus 
1924  1929  1924 
Direct investment 
Europe 
Canada and Newfoundland 
Cuba and other West Indies 
Mexico and Central America 
South America 
Africa, Asia, and Oceania 
Total excl. banking 
Portfolio investment 
Europe 
Canada and Newfoundland 
Cuba and other West Indies 
Mexico and Central America 
South America 
Africa, Asia, and Oceania 
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Table 8.12  Growth in Value of the Stock of U.S. Direct and Portfolio 
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Source: Lewis 1938. 606 
The changes in  value, especially for portfolio  investment, reflect 
some price changes as well as new investment. However, these data 
do not reflect the price changes on individual issues but only changes 
in  exchange  rates.  In any case, very little of the investment was in 
common stock (about 5 percent), and almost all the loans were dollar 
loans (about 95 percent), so neither possible source of price change, 
stock prices or exchange rates, could have been of much importance. 
Thus, the changes in portfolio investment must represent a tremendous 
flurry of new financing during this period. 
The reasons  for  this  concentrated  burst  of  portfolio  investment 
were probably  different from those behind  the direct investment in 
utilities.  The two U.S. companies that were the ultimate parents of 
most of the utility affiliates were major manufacturers of the capital 
goods purchased by the utilities. Neither one was a domestic company 
in  the industries  in  which  these affiliates  operated. The ownership 
of  foreign  utilities  was, in  effect, a  way  of  exploiting the  parents’ 
advantages in technology and marketing in the telephone and electric 
power equipment manufacturing industries. The concentration of these 
investments in  Latin America and their decline were at least partly 
the  result  of  government monopolization  and  regulation,  earlier  in 
Europe and later in  Latin America and Asia as well. 
The burst  of portfolio  investment in  the late  1920s was fueled by 
some of  the  same  speculative  spirit  that  propelled  the  U.S. stock 485  U.S. Changing Patterns of  International Investment 
market in  those years. The concentration in South American invest- 
ment represented, according to one very thorough study (Mintz 1951) 
and  many  contemporary accounts, a large decline in  the quality  of 
credit extended, as the boom of the late  1920s progressed. The fall 
in  quality  is  summarized  by  the fact that  of  the loans  extended  in 
the first  half  of  the  1920s, only  18  percent  went  into default  later, 
while the share of defaults was 50 percent for loans extended in 1925- 
29 (Mintz 1951, 6). 
8.2.5  Defaults and Liquidations, 1929-35 
After the large build-up of  portfolio assets and liabilities in the last 
few years of the 1920s, the depression of the 1930s led to a wave of 
liquidations of security holdings and of defaults on foreign bonds among 
U.S.  investments abroad as well. In addition, asset and liability values 
decreased as a result of declines in prices, but much of this decline is 
concealed by the use of  book values for bonds. We  do have a rough 
estimate of  U.S. international assets with defaulted bonds valued at 
market, but we do not have a similar estimate for market values of 
other securities or direct investment. 
Even  without  any allowance  for default  or price  depreciation on 
bonds, we observe a decline of more than a quarter in securities assets, 
a reduction of short-term assets by almost half, and a decline of about 
20 percent in securities liabilities (table 8.13). The market value of U.S. 
security holdings, taking account of  depreciation on defaulted bonds 
but not on other securities, declined almost 50 percent. 
Table 8.13  The International Balance Sheet of the United States, 1929 and 
1935 (millions of  dollars, current prices) 
1935 
Defaulted 
1929  at Par  at Market 
All Bonds  Bonds 
U.S. private investments abroad 
Direct investment  7,553  7,219  7,219 
Securities  7,839  5,622  4,222 
Short-term credits  1,617  853  853 
Total private  17,009  13,694  12,294 
U.S. liabilities 
Direct investment  1,400  1,580 
Securities  4,304  3,529 
Sequestrated properties  150  - 
Short-term credits  3,077  1,220 
Total private liabilities  8,931  6,329 
Source:  Lewis 1938, 454. 486  Robert E. Lipsey/Mario Schimberni/Robert V.  Lindsay 
By 1935, the primacy of  direct investment among U.S. assets had 
reappeared. Some of the direct investment values may be inflated by 
the use of  book values. Still, mismeasurement of  capital stock is not 
responsible for the main story, as can be seen from the capital flow 
data (table 8.14). The United States continued to invest in  controlled 
companies abroad, at least for the first couple of years, and the decline 
in  value of  these investments must  therefore have  stemmed largely 
from exchange rate changes, and from declines before sale in the value 
of assets sold during the period. 
The data for long-term portfolio and short-term investment reveal a 
repatriation to the United States of about $2 billion. The rest of the $3 
billion decline in the U.S. portfolio assets may reflect some losses from 
declines in the value of foreign currencies relative to the U.S. dollar. 
On the other side, the decline in foreign portfolio and short-term assets 
in the United States of almost $3 billion was less than half accounted 
for by capital flows during the period. 
The United States ran a surplus on goods and services during this 
period of more than $3 billion. The deficits of the U.S. partner countries 
were financed not by private capital flows but by an absorption of gold 
by  the United States of about $3 billion in  the last two years of  the 
period. 
8.2.6  The United States as a Destination of  Flight Capital, 1935-40 
Despite the low level of  economic activity in the United  States in 
the second half of the 1930s, foreign private investment in the United 
States more than doubled.  The fastest growth was in  short-term in- 
vestment, which more than quadrupled, but every category of foreign 
investment grew. 
In contrast, both U.S. direct and U.S.  portfolio investment abroad 
declined, especially the latter.  The $7 billion increase in foreign in- 
Table 8.14  Capital Flows, 1930-35  (millions of  dollars, current prices) 
Capital (-  = outflow) Flow 
U.S. private investment 
Direct investment 
















-  1,906 
-  1,340 
Source: U.S. Bureau of  the Census 1975. Series U  184  23. 487  U.S. Changing Patterns of  International Investment 
vestment in the United States, combined with a cumulative U.S. sur- 
plus on goods and services of almost $5 billion, was financed largely 
by  a $12 billion  flow of  reserve assets into the U.S. government’s 
account (table 8.15). 
An indication of the size of this capital flow is that over the five years 
it was almost 20 percent of gross capital formation and greater than 
net capital formation. In effect, the capital inflow was financing all net 
capital formation in the United States during this period. With this large 
inflow of capital, the United States, after twenty or so years as a net 
creditor on private account, slipped back  into the position  of a net 
debtor, aside from U.S. government holdings of official reserve assets. 
8.2.7  Effects of  World War I1 and the Reconstruction Period on the 
U.S. International Capital Position 
In contrast to World War I, when foreigners liquidated well over half 
their long-term investments in the United States, foreign holdings of 
private U.S. assets were unchanged between the beginning and end of 
World  War  I1  (table 8.16). Foreign holdings of  U.S. government se- 
curities grew  substantially,  while the  U.S. private  sector raised  its 
foreign assets by about 20 percent. The United States remained a net 
debtor outside of its official reserve assets. 
After 1945, the United States resumed its acquisition of private for- 
eign assets, mainly direct investments, and by  1950 the United States 
was once again a net creditor even outside its official reserve assets. 
A $35 billion cumulative surplus in net exports of goods and services 
in the late 1940s was financed partly by the growth of U.S. assets and 
Table 8.15  The International Balance Sheet of the United States, 1935 and 
1940 (billions of dollars, current prices) 
1935  1940 
U.S.  private investment abroad 
Direct 
Other private long term 
Total private long term 
Private short term 
Total private 
Foreign investment in the U.S. 
Direct 
Other private long term 
Total private long term 
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Table 8.16  International Balance Sheet of the United States before and after 
World  War  11  (billions of dollars, current prices) 
1940  1945  1950 
U.S. investment abroad 
Direct 
Other private long term 
Total private long term 
Private short term 
Total private 
Foreign investment in the U.S. 
Direct 
Other private long term 
Total private long term 
Private short term 
Total private 



















































Source: U.S.  Bureau of  the Census 1975. Series U 26-U  39. 
by transfers, but a large fraction-more  than a third-was  financed by 
an accumulation of  official reserve in the hands of the United States. 
8.3  The Internationalization of U.S. Companies 
8.3.1  The Growth of U.S.  Direct Investment Abroad 
after World War I1 
After 1950, the growth of U.S. direct investment abroad, slowed by 
the Great Depression and World War 11, resumed its rise. One measure 
of the spread of U.S. firms, the number of new affiliates established, 
rose rapidly to a peak until the late 1960s, and then slowed down (table 
8.17). 
These data are confined to a fixed group of  corporations that had 
become  multinational by  the time the sample was selected, and the 
decline in  the rate of  establishment  may  have represented only the 
exhaustion of profitable locations for new affiliates by this particular 
group of parents. Furthermore, the data take no account of the size of 
the newly established affiliates or of  their growth after establishment. 
Another measure of foreign direct investment is the value of such 
investment, measured as the book value of parent investment in affil- 
iates as reported on the books of  affiliates.  Since these values  are 
affected by inflation and by the growth of the economy in general, we 
compare the value of direct investment in foreign countries with the 
total assets of  U.S. corporations (table 8.18). These ratios suggest that 489  U.S.  Changing Patterns of International Investment 
~ 
Table 8.17  New Foreign Affiliates Established per Year by  180 Parent Firms 
Number of Affiliates 
1946-52a  55 
1951-55  84 
1956-60  192 
1961-65  322 
1966-67  390 
1968  -69  508 
1970-7 1  43 1 
1972-73  378 
1974  -75  236 
Source: Hood and Young 1979, 22. 
"For 187 parent firms. 
the peak importance of foreign investment relative to all U.S.  corporate 
assets was in the early or mid-l970s, although the year-to-year fluc- 
tuations make it difficult to identify a precise peak. 
Foreign investment was always less important in finance than in other 
industries,  and the ratio for all industries is greatly affected  by  the 
inclusion of  financial corporations. Overseas investment was a much 
Table 8.18  Value of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad as Percentage ofAssets of 
U.S. Corporations 
All  Nonfinancial 
Corporations  Corporations 
1950  2.08  4.21 
1957  2.76  5.59 
1966  3.06  6.72 
1967  3.05  n.a. 
1968  3.03  n.a. 
1969  3.11  n.a. 
1970  3.19  n.a. 
1971  3.13  n.a. 
1972  3.02  n.a. 
1973  3.08  n.a. 
I974  3.06  n.a. 
I975  3.11  n.a. 
1976  3.10  n.a. 
1977  2.97  5.82 
1982  2.45  5.07 
1983  2.24  4.83 
I984  2.10  4.67 
1985  2.07  4.74 
Sources: Value of U.S.  direct investment abroad from appendix, table 8.A.1,  and U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1982; assets of U.S. corporations from Federal Reserve Board 
1979 and  1986, and Musgrave  1986a and  1986b. 490  Robert E. LipseylMario SchimberniIRobert V.  Lindsay 
higher proportion of the assets of nonfinancial  corporations than of 
those of financial corporations or all corporations, but the time pattern 
appears to have been similar: a peak at some point between 1966 and 
1977 (comparable  data for intervening years are not available) and then 
a decline to the levels of the 1950s. 
The amount of investment relative to assets is only one of several 
possible measures of the international activities of U.S. firms. It is the 
one that can be carried back the furthest, but it has several drawbacks. 
At best  it measures the financial stake in  overseas affilitates,  but  it 
does not reflect the level of activity carried on there. U.S. firms could 
be increasing the share of production they carry on abroad or  the share 
of their employment abroad while reducing their investment in foreign 
affiliates and still retaining control of them. More serious problems of 
measurement arise from the fact that the investment in foreign affiliates 
is measured in book values rather than current values and that these 
are subject to the vagaries of currency translation. The tangible assets 
of all U.S. firms, in the denominator of the ratio, are estimated current 
values. The high inflation rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s must 
have raised the totals for U.S.  firms’ assets relative to the values on 
the books of affiliates, and the rise in the value of the dollar from 1982 
to 1985 must have had a similar effect. We must therefore be somewhat 
skeptical about this evidence for a decline in the importance of overseas 
activities. 
A  measure free of  problems  of  valuation  is provided  by data on 
employment, although this measure is also subject to question (table 
8.19). Relative to private nonagricultural employment in  the United 
States (U.S.  Department of Commerce, 1985a),  employment in majority- 
owned affiliates (the only figures available for 1966) rose between 1966 
Table 8.19  Employment in Foreign Affiliates as Percentage of U.S. Private 
Sector Nonagricultural Employment 
All Affiliates  Majority-Owned Affiliates 
Total  Nonbank  Total  Nonbank 
1966  7.3  7.2 
1977  10.9  10.7  8.2a  8.0 
1982  9.2  9.0  7.0a  6.8 
1983  8.6  6.5 
1984  8.1  6.2 
Sources: U.S. private nonagricultural employment from U.S. Department of Commerce 
1985a;  employment in affiliates from Brereton 1986  and U.S. Department of  Commerce 
1975,  1981,  and 1985f. 
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and  1977 (US. Department of Commerce 1975 and  1981). Between 
that date and 1982, all measures of employment declined relative to 
U.S.  employment, and nonbank affiliate employment continued to de- 
cline relatively through  1984 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1985f; 
Brereton 1986). 
The main question about this measure is whether employment is a 
good measure for comparing domestic and overseas labor input. For 
one thing, there was a shift toward female and part-time employment 
in the United States that may not have been matched overseas. Aside 
from the measurement problem, it is hard to know whether the relative 
drop in affiliate employment  from 1977 to 1982 reflects mainly the effect 
of the 1982 recession or is part of  a declining trend. 
One indication in the opposite direction, discussed later, is that ex- 
ports from overseas affiliates have, within manufacturing,  increased 
relative to exports from the United States by the affiliates’ parents and 
Table 8.20  Distribution, by Type of Industry, of U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad 
1985  1982  1977  1966  1957 
TOTAL 
Primary production” 
Manufacturing, incl. petroleum 
refining 
GOODS  PRODUCTION, INCL. 
CONSTRUCTION 
Public utilities and 
transportation, incl. 
petroleum transportation 
GOODS,  PUBLIC UTILITIES, & 
TRANSPORTATION  INCL. 
CONSTRUCTION 
Trade, incl. petroleum 
Finance 
Other services, incl. oil field 
services 
TRADE,  FINANCE & OTHER 
SERVICES 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
17.8  18.4  14.4  27.2  33.9 
44.0  43.4  49.6  44.7  35.7 
62.3  62.4  64.6  72.6  70.0 
1.6  1.9  3.4b  6.8  13.2 
63.9  64.3  68.1  79.4  83.2 
15.6  17.1  16.4=  12.4  11.4 
15.6  13.8  11.3  4.8  3.8 
4.9  4.8  4.3  3.4d  1.6 
36.1  35.7  31.9c  20.6d  16.8 
Source: Appendix, table 8.A. 1. 
Note: Table excludes holding companies and finance affiliates in the Netherlands Antilles. 
“Including petroleum extraction and integrated extraction and refining but not separate 
refining, transportation, or distribution of  petroleum or oil field services. 
blncluding gasoline service stations. 
CExcludes  gasoline service stations. 
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by the United States as a whole. This measure also has defects. It has 
the advantage that all measures are in current values, but it also reflects 
the changing degree of  export orientation of  affiliates, parents, and 
U.S.  firms in general. 
The main changes in the composition of U.S. investment abroad are 
described  in  table 8.20. The major shifts over the thirty  years have 
been  the declines  in  importance of  investment in the production of 
goods, especially primary products,  and in public utilities and trans- 
portation, and the rise in importance of investment in  trade and ser- 
vices. The fall in investment in primary production took place before 
1977, prior to the oil crises. Investment in public utilities and trans- 
portation, accounting for 13 percent of investment in  1957, had been 
reduced to under 2 percent  by  1982. Within the trade  and services 
group, finance was responsible for the great increase in importance of 
the sector. There was some growth in  the importance of  trade, but 
other services, especially outside of oil field services, remained of small 
importance throughout, although they probably did grow. 
8.3.2  The Competitiveness and Comparative Advantage of  U.S. 
Multinational Firms 
It is customary to discuss the competitiveness of  countries and of 
industries in them  in  terms of  their  shares in  world  markets  or of 
particular markets. A country’s competitiveness depends in the short 
run on  the effects of  its monetary and fiscal policies on prices and 
exchange rates and over longer periods on the rate and direction of its 
advances in productivity. 
To  some extent, companies that become multinational in their op- 
erations loosen their dependence on these home-country determinants 
of competitiveness. If home-country production becomes more expen- 
sive relative to foreign production because of  rapid inflation at home 
or because the exchange value of  the home country’s currency has 
risen, or because labor has risen in price or decreased in efficiency, 
the multinational firm has some opportunity to shift its production to 
locations in other countries. 
The competitiveness of the multinational firm depends on the firm’s 
characteristics rather than on those of  its home country. It may  rest 
on the possession of patents or other technological assets based on the 
firm’s R&D. It may rest on the ability to manage or control certain 
types of production or distribution operations. It may originate in ac- 
cess to raw materials on favorable terms or in access to home-country 
markets. All these factors have in common that they can be exploited 
wherever the firm operates. That is, they are mobile geographically 
within the firm but relatively immobile between firms (Lipsey and Kravis 
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We  can imagine a number of possible indicators of the competitive- 
ness of  a firm or a group of firms. One would be its shares in world 
production or world consumption of some set of  products. Another 
would be the share in world trade or in world exports of products or 
groups of products. Still others would be shares in  value-added, em- 
ployment, or capital.  All the indicators have drawbacks. The use of 
employment or capital shares relies on a single factor of production 
when others may be equally important or may behave differently. Value- 
added may be affected by the shifting of profits to minimize taxes or 
for other reasons. Production or consumption is difficult to use because 
world and area aggregates are difficult to assemble. They may also be 
subject to manipulation by host-country governments controlling ac- 
cess to their home markets. 
Shares in  export trade, used  here as a competitiveness measure, 
have drawbacks also-for  one, they slight firms and industries making 
products that, because of weight or bulk, or for other reasons, tend to 
be supplied from within the countries where they are consumed. De- 
spite the drawbacks, export shares have a number of  advantages as 
measures of  competitiveness. One is that there are reasonably com- 
prehensive world and regional aggregates against which to measure a 
firm’s share. The main advantage of using exports rather than produc- 
tion for this purpose is that exports are more footloose. A country has 
more power to determine which producers supply its home market than 
which supply export markets. Shares in export markets may, therefore, 
represent the underlying economic advantages of  firms and countries 
to a greater degree than do shares in production. 
That is not to say that export markets are unaffected by government 
interventions or other noneconomic factors. The imposition of export 
requirements on U.S. affiliates by some governments as the price for 
acquisition of a local firm in  the host country or even for continued 
operation in  the country has been a source of  much friction between 
the United States and these countries. However, these export-promoting 
policies are circumscribed by the ability of companies to leave markets 
where the costs imposed on them are too high. They are also limited 
by the watchfulness of other countries over their own home and export 
markets. 
The competitiveness of U.S. multinationals, measured by their ex- 
port shares, can be described and compared to that of the United States 
as a country by the figures in table 8.21. The shares of the United States 
and its multinationals were about equal in  1966, but the multinationals 
kept their share remarkably constant while that of  the United States 
declined, particularly in the earlier years. The parent firms of the U.S. 
multinationals did not escape the forces that led to the fall in the U.S. 
export share, but the fall in the parents’ share was a little smaller than 
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Table 8.21  Share of World Exports of Manufactures (percentage) 
U.S. 
U.S. Multinationals  us.  Parent Firms 
1966  17.7 
1977  17.6 
1982  17.7 
1983  17.7 
17.5  11.0 
13.3  9.2 
14.3  9.5 
13.9  9.1 
Source: Lipsey and Kravis 1986. 
The multinationals were more successful than nonmultinational U.  S. 
firms in world markets for manufactured goods. What kept the multi- 
nationals’ share in world exports up was the success of their exports 
from their foreign affiliates, a record that can be traced back twenty- 
five years (table 8.22). In the first twenty years, the shares of U.S. 
multinationals’ affiliates in both developed countries and LDCs grew 
rapidly, but after that, only the shares of the LDC affiliates grew, while 
affiliates in  the developed  countries more or less  held  their  shares 
steady. 
This growth in exports from foreign affiliates implies that larger and 
larger portions of world market shares outside the United States held 
by U.S. multinationals and by all U.S.  firms were being supplied from 
production outside the United States, as can be seen from table 8.23. 
By 1983, almost half of all manufactured  exports by U.S.  multinationals 
and over 40 percent  of manufactured  exports by all U.S. firms were 
supplied by foreign affiliates of the multinationals. 
We  can identify the comparative advantage of U.S. multinationals 
by the industry distribution of their exports relative to that of the United 
States as a country or  of the world. Another way of putting this measure 
is  saying that we  take the multinationals’  share of  exports in  each 
industry relative to their share in all industries combined. This measure 
Table 8.22  Share in World Exports of Manufactures of U.S. Majority-Owned 
Foreign Affiliates (percentage) 
In All  In Developed 
Countries  Countries  In LDCs 
1957  4.5  4.1  0.5 
I966  6.8 (6.6)”  6.3 (6.2)”  0.5 
1977  8.4  7.6  0.8 
I982  8.3  7.3  I .o 
I983  8.6  7.6  1.1 
Source: Lipsey and Kravis 1986, appendix, table U-la. 
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Table 8.23  Share of  U.S. Majority-Owned Affiliates in  Exports of 
Manufactures (percentage) 
Share by  Share by 
U.S.  Multinationals  All  U.S. Firms 
1957  n.a.  17.6 
1966  38.1  27.8 (28.9)” 
I977  47.7  40.0 
1982  46.7  38.7 
1983  48.7  40.2 
Source: Lipsey and Kravis 1986. 
acornparable  to 1957. 
is sometimes referred to as “revealed comparative advantage” and has 
the drawbacks of such measures. For example, it is not based on the 
presumed determinants of comparative advantage and incorporates the 
effects of trade barriers, subsidies, and many other factors that can 
affect trade flows. 
If  we take these distributions for 1966, the first year for which we 
have the data, we find that the United States as a country enjoyed 
comparative advantages relative to the world as a whole in chemicals, 
machinery, and transport equipment, and comparative disadvantages 
in food products, metals, and miscellaneous manufacturing industries. 
The comparative advantages of US.  multinationals were in the same 
industries, but to a larger degree, and the same was true for the com- 
parative disadvantages of the multinationals. Thus, if we compare U.S. 
multinationals with the United States as a country, the multinationals 
had comparative advantages over other U.S.  firms in chemicals, ma- 
chinery, and especially transport equipment, and disadvantages relative 
to the United States in foods, metals, and miscellaneous manufacturing 
industries (see table 8.24). In other words, where the United  States 
was strong, U.S. multinationals, taken as a group, were stronger. And 
where the United States was weak, U.S. multinationals as a group were 
Table 8.24  Industry Share in Manufactured Exports Relative to Share in 
World Exports, 1966 
~~  ~  ~ 
U.S.  U.S. Multinationals 
Foods  66.7  44.1 
Chemicals  123.8  128.6 
Metals  76.6  47.1 
Machinery  138.3  142.2 
Other manufacturing  68.8  61.4 
Source: Lipsey and Kravis 1986, appendix, table U-9. 
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weaker. That is not to say that there were no individual U.S. multi- 
nationals with comparative advantages in foods or metals that permitted 
them to operate in many countries. The data show that such firms were 
less common in these industries than in chemicals or machinery. 
Sixteen years later, the main outlines of the story were similar (table 
8.25). There was a slight weakening of the U.S. position in chemicals 
and transport equipment, as well as in the already weak metals area, 
and a stronger comparative advantage in machinery. Within machinery, 
the U.  S. comparative advantage in nonelectrical machinery increased 
and that in electrical machinery declined. 
U.S. multinationals increased their comparative advantage in chem- 
icals relative to the world and to the United States as a country, but 
their previously very large comparative advantage relative to the world 
in transport equipment was substantially reduced. Their comparative 
disadvantages  in foods and metals were also reduced, but  remained 
large. In  1982, U.S. multinationals still showed a large comparative 
advantage relative to the world in  chemicals, nonelectrical  and elec- 
trical machinery, and transport equipment, but there was one exception 
to the rule  that their  comparative advantages were an accentuated 
version of U.S. comparative advantage. That exception was in non- 
electrical machinery, in which the comparative advantage of the United 
States as a country exceeded that of the U.S. multinationals. 
For 1977 and 1982 it is possible to examine the comparative advantage 
of U.S. multinationals for a much finer breakdown of industry groups 
into thirty or more industries. The industries in which  U.S.  multina- 
tionals exhibited the largest comparative advantage relative to the world 
were, in order: (1)  tobacco products, (2) office and computing machin- 
ery, (3) electronic components, (4) soaps, cleansers, and so forth, (5) 
drugs, and (6) construction machinery (see the appendix, table 8.A.3). 
Of the six, four were also among the industries of greatest comparative 
Table 8.25  Industry Share in Exports  by the United States and by US. 
Multinationals Relative to Share in World Exports, 1982 
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advantage for the United States as a country, exceptions being the two 
chemical groups. These industries are characterized by high expendi- 
tures on R&D (office and computing machinery, drugs, and electronic 
components)  and  on  advertising  (tobacco products,  drugs,  soaps, 
cleansers, etc.). 
The 1977-82  period was one in which the shift by  multinationals 
from the United States to their overseas affiliates as their export base, 
which was strong in the previous decade, was interrupted and even 
reversed  to a small extent.  As might be expected, there  was  wide 
variation among industries in  this respect. Most of the industries in 
which U.S. multinationals’ exports rose rapidly saw a continuation of 
the  shift to overseas production for export. That category included 
drugs, industrial  chemicals, other chemicals, other transport equip- 
ment, plastic products, and instruments. Two major exceptions were 
office and computing machinery and electronic components. There was 
not a major shift back to the United  States (in percentage terms) in 
these two industries, but there was clearly no move away from U.S. 
operations. 
By comparing the distributions of exports of US.  multinationals for 
1977 and 1982 with those of  the United States for the same year, we 
can get some notion of the distinctive comparative advantages of these 
firms, as compared with the United  States as a geographical entity 
(appendix, table 8.A.5). Among the major groups, the multinationals 
showed  comparative advantages in  chemicals, electrical machinery, 
and transport equipment, but not in foods, metals, nonelectrical ma- 
chinery, and “other manufacturing.” 
The ratios for more detailed industries are suggestive. Within foods, 
the  multinationals  held  a large  advantage over other U.S.  firms in 
beverages, probably an advertising-intensive industry.  In chemicals, 
the  largest  advantage was  in  soaps, cleaners, and the like,  also an 
advertising-intensive field, followed by drugs and, by a small margin, 
industrial chemicals, the former extremely R&D-intensive, the latter a 
little above average. In nonelectrical machinery, the largest advantage 
of  multinationals over other U.S. firms was in office and computing 
machinery,  by  far the  most  R&D-intensive  group.  In  the electrical 
machinery group, the multinationals’ advantages were large relative to 
the United States in electronic components and, in 1982, also in com- 
munications  equipment,  both  R&D-intensive  industries,  but  not  in 
“other  electrical machinery,”  the most R&D-intensive.  However, in 
electrical machinery, the lines are quite blurry among the detailed in- 
dustries. Many parents seem to cross these detailed industry lines. 
There are a number of indications here that both R&D intensity and 
advertising intensity are major factors in the comparative advantage 
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shares in foreign markets (for example, in Caves 1974). R&D intensity 
is a variable that has been associated in many studies with the com- 
parative advantage of  the United  States as a country (for example, 
Baldwin 1979; Stern and Maskus 1981). Our data confirm that asso- 
ciation. If  we relate the share of  an industry in U.S. exports relative 
to its share in world exports (USIW)  to the R&D intensity of industries, 
as measured by the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales (RDIS),  we find 
we can explain a substantial part (40 percent) of the interindustry dif- 
ferences in U.S. export shares in 1977 with that factor alone (t-statistics 
in parentheses). 
(1)  USIW = .089 + .022 RDIS;  R2 = .40. 
(5.96)  (4.40) 
However, the same R&D intensities are even more strongly related 
to the comparative advantage of U.S. multinationals in the same year, 
measured in the same way (share of industry in multinationals’ exports 
relative to its share in world exports, (or CJSMNCIW). 
(2)  USMNCIW = 0.98 + .052 RDIS;  R2 = .49. 
(3.39) (5.26) 
The foreign investment survey does not include data on advertising 
intensity, the other characteristic associated with U.S. multinationals’ 
comparative advantage,  but  R&D intensity  at least is one attribute 
explaining the comparative advantages of the United States and of U.S. 
multinationals, especially that of the multinationals. 
8.3.3  Changing Characteristics of U.S.-Owned Foreign Operations 
U.S.  affiliates in foreign countries exist mainly to serve local markets. 
About two-thirds of their sales have been in their host countries in the 
last few years.  Exporting is most important for affiliates in  primary 
production-agriculture,  mining, and the extraction of petroleum-in 
all of which a majority of  sales were outside the host country (table 
8.26). The reason for the export orientation of  affiliates in  these in- 
dustries is that they were drawn to their locations not by the prospect 
of breaking into or enlarging their shares of  the host country’s market 
but by the presence of relatively cheap resources. 
At the other end of the scale, affiliates in some noncommodity in- 
dustries-public  utilities, retail trade, and business and personal ser- 
vicesconcentrated heavily in their host-country markets. 
Over the last quarter century, the trend  has been for affiliates to 
become more export oriented. The share of exports in total sales more 
than doubled for manufacturing affiliates. That is a substantial shift in 
orientation, but not as large as the rise in the share of  exports in GNP 
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Table 8.26  Affiliate Exports as Percentage of Sales, Majority-Owned 
Affiliates, by  Industry 
1957  1966  1977  1982  1983  1984 
All  industries 




Other, incl. oil field services 
Manufacturing 
Construction 




Finance (excl. banking), 












































34.5  35.2  36.5 
72.6  73.5  74.6 
82.4  79.5  80.7 
35.4  37.0  36.4 
61.4  61.0  61.0 
30.1  31.7  29.6 
33.9  35.1  37.5 
9.5  10.6  11.1 
9.2  6.3  8.3 
36.9  34.6  35.2 
41.7  39.8  40.3 
2.2  2.1  1.5 
37.8  41.2  46.2 
19.8  20.3  20.3 
Source: Appendix, table 8.A.7. 
The export orientation of affiliates varies by location as well as by 
industry (table 8.27). Affiliates in all industries combined were more 
export oriented in developing than in developed countries, partly be- 
cause those in natural resource  industries were large exporters and 
partly because of the high ratios for the Asia and Pacific countries. In 
manufacturing, the affiliates in Asia and Pacific countries exported over 
40 percent of  their sales. Affiliates in Japan and in Oceania were very 
Table 8.27  Exports as Percentage of Sales, Majority-Owned Affiliates, by 
Location, 1982 































Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1985f, tables 111.D3, III.El, and III.E3. 
aSuppressed observations estimated by the author. 
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inward-looking, perhaps because these countries had  comparatively 
protected markets. 
For the most part, overseas affiliates have relied little on the United 
States as a market, with slightly more than 10  percent of their sales in 
the two most recent years for which we have data and a similar pro- 
portion for twenty-five  years earlier (table 8.28). The unusually low 
share in  1966 and the exceptionally high U.S. share in  1977 both re- 
flected mainly the fluctuations of the petroleum industry. 
Affiliates in primary production-agriculture,  mining, and petroleum 
extraction-have,  in general, been the most dependent on the U.S. 
market, although the finance (except banking), insurance, and real es- 
tate group entered that category in  1982. In the other broad industry 
groups-manufacturing,  construction, public utilities  and transporta- 
tion, wholesale and retail trade, and services-sales  to the United States 
have ranged from less than one percent of affiliate sales to a little over 
10 percent. 
If there has been any trend  in  some of the groups, it seems to be 
toward an increasing dependence on the U.S. market. The largest jump 
was in the finance group, as mentioned  above, but there have been 
persistent increases in manufacturing (more than a doubling of the share 
of sales to the United States)  and, over the last few years, a substantial 
one in wholesale trade. The rise of almost 50 percent in the dependence 
of manufacturing affiliates on the U.S. market suggests the influence 
Table 8.28  Exports to the United States as Percentage of Sales, Majority- 
Owned Affiliates,  by Industry 
1957  1966  1977  1982  1983  1984 
All industries 




Other, incl. oil field services 
Manufacturing 
Construction 




estate (excl. banking) 
Finance, insurance, and real 
Services 
9.9"  6.4  18.5  10.5  10.9  12.4 
38.2  n.a.  30.1  40.7  39.7  39.1 
44.2  37.9  28.1  28.5  30.9  32.3 
9.9  5.4  35.7  13.7  12.4  13.5 
n.a.  n.a.  36.0  40.1  35.7  31.4 
n.a.  n.a.  35.7  8.3  7.3  8.5 
6.0  5.6  9.1  9.7  11.6  14.0 
n.a.  n.a.  .7  .3  .3  .4 
n.a.  7.4  .6  6.4  3.2  4.2 
n.a.  3.6  2.9  4.3  5.0  5.3 
n.a.  n.a.  3.4  4.8  5.7  6.1 
n.a.  n.a.  .2  .2  .5  .2 
n.a.  n.a.  5.9  23.0  25.3  25.5 
n.a.  n.a.  4.2  5.4  5.3  6.0 
Source: Appendix. table 8.A.7. 
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of the increasing exchange value of the dollar in those years. It remains 
to be seen whether the reversal in exchange rates will undo this shift 
in orientation. 
A widely discussed trend  in the character of direct investment by 
the United  States and by other countries has been the move toward 
shared ownership, and particularly  toward minority ownership, with 
majority shares in the hands of citizens of the host country. The less 
developed countries, particularly in Latin America, have promoted this 
trend. Restrictions on majority ownership were written into the Andean 
Pact and into Mexican law. 
Despite the pressure from host-country governments, U.S. parent 
companies have been more reluctant  to share ownership in affiliates 
than companies from other countries. Of the multinationals’ affiliates 
surveyed in the Harvard program that were established  before  1951, 
58 percent of the U.S.-owned affiliates, 39 percent of European affil- 
iates, and 27 percent of affiliates of firms in other countries were wholly 
owned. All these proportions had decreased by the late 1960s to 46 
percent,  19  percent, and 6 percent, but the preference of US.  firms 
for 100 percent ownership remains clear (OECD 1981, 50). 
There has been some move by U.S. multinationals toward sharing 
ownership. The proportion of total  affiliate sales made by  majority- 
owned affiliates fell from 88 percent in 1966 to 77 percent in 1982. The 
decline took place in the first ten years of that period, however, and 
there was actually a small rise between 1977 and 1982. 
There are large differences among industries  in the shares of majority- 
owned affiliates, and the reduced share in the aggregate could represent 
shifts among, as well as within, industries. It is clear, however (see 
appendix, table 8.A.8) that in all the major industry groups, the pro- 
portion of sales by affiliates less than majority owned grew between 
1966 and 1982 in both developed countries and LDCs. The rise of these 
affiliates was important in mining, retail trade, and public utilities and 
transportation, and in LDCs they accounted for half or more of affiliate 
sales in these industries by 1982. Thus, if the growth of these firms has 
been a response to host countries’ efforts to gain substantial shares in 
the equity of foreign-owned affiliates, the efforts have met with some 
success. 
Given that technological or proprietary information is the basis for 
the competitive advantage of multinational firms, one might expect that 
the more important these factors were in an industry, the greater would 
be the reluctance of parent companies to share these advantages and 
the stronger the insistence on control or, preferably, total ownership 
of affiliates. It is indeed the case that among manufacturing industries, 
those that rank high with respect to spending on R&D are also among 
those with the highest shares of majority ownership (table 8.29). The 502  Robert E. Lipsey/Mario Schimberni/Robert V.  Lindsay 
Table 8.29  Sales of Majotity-Owned Affiliates as Percentage of  AfSliate Sales 
1977  1982 
Developed  Developed 
Countries  LDCs  Countries  LDCs 
All manufacturing  80.5  71 .O  76.5  71.1 
DNgS  93.8  86.0  96.2  93.8 
Office and computer machines  94.7  97.5  94.0  99.5 
Electronic comp. and access.  80.5  95.3  78.9  96.0 
Source: Appendix, table 8.A.8. 
only exception was electronic components and accessories in devel- 
oped countries, largely in Japan (a country in which less than 20 percent 
of manufacturing affiliate sales are from majority-owned affiliates). In 
fact, in these industries, the share of majority-owned affiliates actually 
increased between 1977 and 1982, despite the decline in the majority- 
owned share in manufacturing as a whole. 
It is clear, then, that the policy of forcing shared ownership has not 
been very successful for the LDCs in 'R&D-intensive industries. The 
cost of enforcing the policy may have been too great: a reduction in 
foreign investment in these industries and in  the consequent transfer 
of technology. 
8.4  The United States as a Recipient of  Foreign Direct Investment 
8.4.1  The Recent Growth of Foreign Direct Investment in the 
United States 
During the 1960s, as U.S. direct investment in foreign countries was 
reaching its peak rate of growth, hardly any of the world's flow of new 
direct investment was coming to the United States (table 8.30). From 
1961 through 1967, less than 3 percent of the flow to developed countries 
came to the  United  States, and in  1967 the  United  States was  the 
location of less than 10 percent of the world stock of direct investment 
(Hood and Young  1979, 18; U.S.  Bureau of  the Census  1975, Series 
U-35). The U.S.  share of  inflows of direct investment to developed 
countries rose to over 10 percent in 1968-73, and since then has been 
over 20 percent in every year through  1983. It has stayed over one- 
third since 1978 and reached as high as two-thirds in 1981. The U.S. 
share of inflows to all countries has been over a quarter since the late 
1970s and reached a peak close to 50 percent in 1981. The United States 
has absorbed more than all developing countries together since 1978 
and usually more than all the European countries combined. 
With this large inflow of direct investment, the stock of foreign direct 
investment in the United States has been growing very rapidly. One 503  U.S. Changing Patterns of International Investment 
Table 8.30  Direct Investment Inflows to the United States as Percentage of 
Inflows to the World and Developed Countries 
Developed 
World  Countries 
1961  -67  2.6 
1968- 73  11.4 
1970  15.0  18.5 
1971  3.4  4.6 
1972  7.4  9.3 
1973  17.5  23.2 
1974  25.8  26.6 
1975  13.4  22.1 
1976  30.9  38.6 
1977  14.6  23.6 
1978  26.4  35.2 
1979  30.0  40.5 
1980  35.6  46.0 
1981  47.5  66.0 
1982  36.9  55.0 
1983  29.0  39.0 
Sources: United Nations 1983, annex table 11.2, and 1985, table 11.1; OECD 1981. 
indication  of  the growth  is  the  comparison with  assets of  all  U.S. 
corporations (table 8.3  1). After staying around one-half of one percent 
from 1950 through 1966, the ratio tripled in the next twenty years, and 
more than doubled in the eight years from 1977 to 1985. 
Another way of  describing the growth of  foreign direct investment 
in  the United States is by comparing it with U.S.  investment abroad 
(table 8.32). The greatest leap in foreign investment in the United States 
relative to U.S. investment abroad took place in the five years from 
1977 to 1982, when foreign direct investment grew from less than a 
quarter of  U.S. direct investment abroad to 60 percent of  it, and the 
ratio has continued to increase rapidly since 1982. 
Table 8.31  Stock (Book Value) of Foreign Direct Investment in the United 
States as Percentage of Assets of All US.  Corporations 
1950  .6 
1960  .6 
1966  .5 
1974  .7 
1977  .7 
1980  1.2 
1982  1.5 
1985  1.6 
Sources: Appendix, table 8.A.9; Federal Reserve Board  1979 and 1986; and Musgrave 
1986a and 1986b. 504  Robert E. LipseylMario SchimberniIRobert V.  Lindsay 
Table 8.32  Stock (Book Value) of Foreign Direct Investment in the United 
States as Percentage of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. 
1950  28.8 
1966  17.5 
1977  23.7 
1982  60.0 
1983  66.1 
1984  77.3 
1985  78.6 
Sources: Appendix, tables 8.A.1 and 8.A.9. 
Since these are book values, they are subject to the familiar doubts 
about their meaning and comparability. The U.S.  direct investments 
abroad are much older, on average, than the foreign direct investments 
in the United  States and were made in periods of much lower asset 
prices. It is therefore likely that the use of book values understates the 
value of U.S. investments relative to market values much more than 
it does the foreign investments. Thus, the extent and growth of foreign 
investment in the United States relative to U.S. investment abroad is 
probably considerably exaggerated in these figures. 
Another fact that points to such a bias is the difference in income. 
Despite the relatively  small ostensible difference in  the value of the 
stocks, income on U.S. direct investment abroad was more than four 
times as large as income on foreign direct investment in the United 
States in 1985 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1986a and 1986b). 
For the most recent decade or so, data on employment provide  a 
measure of foreign firms’ participation in the U.S.  economy that is free 
of the effects of exchange rate changes and conversion methods. This 
measure too demonstrates the rapid growth of foreign-owned opera- 
tions, but also indicates that their role in the U.S.  economy as a whole 
remains small (table 8.33). 
A  point to keep in mind in  comparing inward  and outward direct 
investment is  that U.S. firms  became multinational  earlier  than did 
Table 8.33  Employment in Nonbank U.S. Affiliates of  Foreign Companies as 
Percentage of  U.S. Private Sector Nonagricultural Employment 
I974  1.6 
1977  1.8 
1980  2.7 
1982  3.3 
1984  3.4 
Sources; Appendix, table 8.A. 10; U.S. Department of  Commerce 1985~1,  46-48. 505  U.S. Changing Patterns of  International Investment 
most foreign firms and probably reached something like an equilibrium 
stock of foreign assets by the end of the 1960s. After that, there was 
not a large net movement of U.S. firms into multinational status. For- 
eign firms, in contrast, have, for the most part, become multinational 
fairly recently and are adding to their overseas operations rapidly be- 
cause they have not reached the goals they have set. One indication 
of the relative maturity in this sense of U.S. direct investment is that 
all (and more) of its growth came from reinvested earnings in 1984 and 
1985, while most of the growth of other countries’ direct investment 
in the United States is from flows of new equity and debt (table 8.34). 
U.S. parents were bringing some of their foreign assets back to the 
United States by reducing equity and intercompany debt, while foreign 
companies were increasing their holdings of U.S. assets far beyond 
their accumulation of reinvested earnings. 
8.4.2  Characteristics of Foreign-Owned Affiliates in the 
United States 
The fact that the share of foreign-owned firms in U.S. employment 
was still only about 3.5 percent in  1985  might  appear to deflate the 
anxieties that have been aroused by the inflow of  direct investment. 
However, the explanation for that concern lies in the concentration of 
the investment; half of the employment in foreign-owned firms is in 
manufacturing,  which  accounted for only  about  15  percent of total 
nonagricultural employment in the United  States in  1984 (appendix, 
table 8.A.10). 
Aside from mining, the ratios for which  are affected  seriously by 
incomparabilities  between numerator and denominator,  the greatest 
foreign share in  U.S.  employment-7  percent-is  in  manufacturing. 
That share almost tripled in ten years (table 8.35). 
Employment in foreign-owned manufacturing operations more than 
doubled, while total U.S. employment in manufacturing stayed about 
constant or even declined a little. Employment in foreign service af- 
Table 8.34  Shares in Changes in the Value of  Direct Investment, 1984 and 
1985 (percentage) 
U.S. in Foreign  Foreign Countries 
Countries  In  U.S. 
Equity and intercompany debt  -  28.2  85.4 
Reinvested earnings  117.0  8.7 
Valuation adjustment  -  11.2  5.8 
Total  100.0  100.0 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce 1986a and 1986b. 506  Robert E. LiDseviMario Schimberni/Robert V.  Lindsay 
Table 8.35  Employment in U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Corporations as 
Percentage of Total US. Private Sector Employment, by Broad 
Industrv Groups 




GOODS  PRODUCTION 
Transportation and public utilities 
GOODS,  TRANSP.,  & PUB.  UTIL. 
Wholesale trade 
Retail trade 
Finance, insurance and real estateb 
Services 
TRADE  & SERVICES 
16.8  13.0  12.4  14.5 
2.7  3.5  5.4  6.6 
.2  .3  1  .O  I .3 
2.8  3.3  5 .O  6.2 
1  .o  .5  .7  1.1 
2.5  2.9  4.3  5.3 
2.8  3.2  4.1  5.3 
1 .O  1.0  2.0  2.6 
1.1c  1.1  2.1  2.3 
.3  .2  .5  .6 













Sources: Appendix, table 8.A.10; U.S. Department of  Commerce 1985a, 46-48. 
+v.Auding  petroleum. 
bBanking included in denominator but not in numerator. 
Clncluding  banking would be 1.8 percent. 
filiates rose at an even faster rate than in goods production. However, 
in these industries U.S. total employment was also rising, by about 50 
percent over ten  years. As a  result, although  the foreign  share in- 
creased, it did not grow as rapidly as in manufacturing. 
At the end of the period, among trade, finance, and services, it was 
only in  wholesale trade, probably  closely tied to the distribution  of 
imported goods, that the share of employment in foreign-owned firms 
reached 5 percent. In other groups the foreign share was under 3 per- 
cent. However, the ratios for finance, insurance, and real estate are 
understated because the data for foreign-owned firms omit banks. It 
seems clear, however, that foreign penetration of the service sectors 
was relatively small. 
Within manufacturing, also, there were wide differences among in- 
dustries in the degree of foreign penetration. In 1984, almost 40 percent 
of manufacturing employment in the chemical industry was in foreign- 
owned firms, while the proportions in other industries were all under 
10 percent (table 8.36). 
The foreign  share increased substantially  in  every group, at least 
doubling within each industry. However, the ranking of the industries 
hardly changed at all. The greatest degree of foreign penetration was 
in chemicals at the beginning and end of  the period, followed by food 
manufacturing industries, and there was a relatively small foreign em- 
ployment share in nonelectrical machinery in both periods. Thus the 
comparative advantages of foreign firms relative to U.S.  firms seemed 
to remain in the same industries. 507  U.S. Changing Patterns of  International Investment 
Table 8.36  Employment in U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Corporations as 
Percentage of Employment in All U.S. Firms, by Industry within 
Manufacturing 
All manufacturing 
Food and kindred products 
Chemicals 
Metals 
Machinery, excl. electrical 



















Sources: Appendix, table 8.A. 10; U.S. Department of Commerce 1985a, 46-48 
The industry distribution of employment in foreign firms in 1984 was 
much more concentrated in manufacturing and petroleum, and in goods- 
producing industries as  a group, than was U.S. employment in general, 
as can be seen in table 8.37. The shares in trade and finance did not 
diverge as much from those of the United States as a whole, especially 
if  one takes account of the omission of banks from the total of foreign 
holdings.  However, the share of employment in foreign-owned com- 
panies that was in service industries was less than a third of that for 
U.S. firms. 
The differences in the distributions  reflect two influences. Foreign 
firms may have had a comparative advantage in goods production and 
U.S. firms in service production. However, the results may also reflect 
differences in the difficulty of carrying across national boundaries the 
comparative advantages of firms. Whatever gives firms a comparative 
advantage or competitiveness in  manufacturing  industries, whether 
ownership of  patents or knowledge of production techniques or man- 
agement abilities, may be easier to move across national boundaries 
than the characteristics that distinguish firms in trade and service in- 
dustries. That might be because of inherent characteristics of the two 
groups of  industries or because there are many more regulatory  and 
similar obstacles placed in the path of service industry producers than 
in the path of goods-producing companies. Since entry into the U.S. 
market is relatively unrestricted and the share of foreign firms in ser- 
vices is small, the suspicion that there are inherent obstacles to service 
industry direct investment is reinforced. 
The main  trends in the industry distribution of  foreign firms’ em- 
ployment appear to move it toward the U.S. pattern. That is, the share 
of mining and petroleum was declining, as was that of manufacturing, 
after 1977. The main increase in importance  within foreign-owned com- 
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Table 8.37  Distribution by Industry of  Employment in Foreign-Owned Firms in 
the United States 
Empl. in 
All Private 
Employment in  Sector 
Foreign-Owned Firms  U.S. Firms 






GOODS  PRODUCTION 
Transportation and public utilities 
GOODS,  TRANSP.,  & PUBL UTIL. 
Wholesale trade 
Retail trade 
Finance, Insurance, and real estate 
Services 
TRADE  & SERVICES 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
}  1.2  2.2  1.3  1.2  1.7 
9.0  7.4  5.0  5.0  4.6 
52.5  56.7  54.6  51.0  50.9 ’  24.7 
.8  1.1  2.1  2.1  1.6  5.5 
64.4  66.5  63.0  59.8  58.3  31.5 
4.3  1.9  1.8  2.3  2.3  6.6 
68.7  68.4  64.8  62.1  60.6  38.1 
11.6  12.6  10.7  11.5  10.8  7.1 
11.5  11.7  15.0  16.3  16.8  21.1 
4.5a  4.2  5.3  5.0  4.7  7.2” 
3.9  3.1  4.2  5.0  7.1  26.5 




Sources: Appendix, table 8.A. 10; U.S. Department of  Commerce 1985a. 46-48. 
Note: Foreign-owned firms means U .S. nonbank affiliates of  foreign corporations. 
“Including banking, 6.6 percent. 
bIncluding banking. 
8.4.3  Sources of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 
As foreign direct investment has flowed into the United States in the 
last few years there have been periodic alarms about increasing control 
of U.S. industry by companies from the Middle East or Japan. Despite 
the publicized incidents of investments from these countries, the great 
bulk-two-thirds  of the total-of foreign direct investment in the United 
States continues to be controlled by European firms. Over 40 percent 
of the foreign investment is concentrated in two countries, the Neth- 
erlands and the United Kingdom (table 8.38). 
The identification of firms by  nationality is often uncertain. These 
ratios may well understate the ultimate Japanese and middle eastern 
stake that is partly held through firms incorporated in Europe. Data 
on U.S. direct investment abroad include investments by  U.S. firms 
controlled by foreigners, and data on foreign direct investment in the 
United States include investment by foreign firms controlled by U.S. 
parents. In the latter case, however, the surveys include a classification 
by ultimate beneficial ownership. 
The shares of the different countries and areas vary from industry 
to industry. Invesment in the petroleum industry, for example, is over- 509  U.S. Changing Patterns of  International Investment 




























Source: Appendix, table 8.A.11. 
whelmingly from Europe, over 80 percent of  the total from the Neth- 
erlands and the United Kingdom (appendix, table 8.A.  11). Investment 
in manufacturing, the area that receives most public attention, is also 
largely from Europe-about  three-quarters-but  several countries par- 
ticipate: 9 percent  from  France,  10  percent  from  Germany,  and  12 
percent from Switzerland, aside from the usual high proportion, over 
40 percent, from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Japan ac- 
counts for less than 5 percent of this investment. 
Japan’s investment is concentrated in wholesale trade. That invest- 
ment is more than half of Japan’s total investment position in the United 
States and is more than 40 percent of total foreign direct investment 
in the industry. Japan also plays a larger role in investment in U.S. 
banking-almost  a fifth-than  in the other industries. 
Investment from Latin America, largely from the Netherlands An- 
tilles, is more concentrated in the U.S. real estate industry than that 
from any other source. More than a quarter of  Latin America direct 
investment and that from the Netherlands Antilles is in real estate, and 
over a quarter of total foreign direct investment in real estate is from 
Latin America, most from the Netherlands Antilles. 
The sources of  the most recent growth in the foreign investment 
position in the United States do not suggest revolutionary changes in 
the pattern (table 8.39). Europe accounted for two-thirds of the addi- 
tions over the last five years, as it did for the stock. The major change 
was that Japan was the source of 14 percent of the additions, as com- 
pared to only 6 percent of the 1980 stock, and the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom less than 50 percent of additions as compared with a 
share in the  1980 stock of almost 60 percent. Within manufacturing, 510  Robert E. Lipsey/Mario Schimberni/Robert V.  Lindsay 
Table 8.39  Share in Changes in Foreign Direct Investment Position in the 






















Source: Appendix, table 8.A.11. 
increases in investment from France were small relative to the initial 
stock and those from Switzerland and Japan were relatively large, the 
latter from a very small base of only 3 percent of total foreign invest- 
ment in manufacturing. 
8.5  Portfolio Investment and Aggregate Investment Flows 
and Stocks 
The capital  account of  the United  States has gone through  wide 
swings, representing what appears to be an underlying evolution of the 
United States from steady capital exporter in the 1960s to the world’s 
major capital importer in the mid-1980s. The major element of the U.S. 
capital outflow in the first decade was the steadily growing direct in- 
vestment flow to foreign countries, averaging about $4.5 billion  per 
year (table 8.40). That trend of direct investment was not interrupted 
in the next few years, but it was outweighed in  1971 and  1972 by the 
monetary troubles of the United States, reflected  in the additions to 
foreign official holdings in the United States of over $18.5 billion a year 
Table 8.40  Net U.S. Capital Outflow (-) or Inflow (+)  Annual Averages 
(billions of dollars, current prices) 
U.S.  Capital 
Outflow/Inflow 
1960-70  -  2.8 
1971-72  +  8.7 
1973  -82  -  13.3 
1983-85  +69.8 
Source: Appendix, table 8.A. 12. 511  U.S. Changing Patterns of International Investment 
and, until the devaluation of the dollar, by the running down of foreign 
deposits in  U.S. banks. 
The next ten years were turbulent, including the two oil price shocks 
and two U.S. recessions that were severe by post-World  War I1 stan- 
dards. U.S. direct investment abroad continued to grow and accounted 
for capital export averaging about $12.5 billion a year, but it was re- 
duced severely by  the  1982 recession and did not recover to earlier 
levels until 1985. However, a new element entered the picture in this 
decade: foreign lending by U.S. banks at the rate of over $37 billion a 
year,  dwarfing the direct investment that had been dominant in the 
1960s. As U.S. banks lent abroad, they also absorbed deposits from 
abroad that were far larger than in earlier years, averaging over $20 
billion a year. While the two series were not perfectly  synchronized, 
the bank lending and bank borrowing did move more or less in  step, 
as U.S. banks  acted  as intermediaries between the countries  accu- 
mulating assets and those absorbing them. The inflow of capital to the 
United States also included large additions to foreign holdings of U.S. 
Treasury  securities and, beginning in  the late  1970s, large direct in- 
vestment flows to the United States. 
The next few years were to see a spectacular reversal of  the U.S. 
position. U.S. bank lending, which had averaged over $37 billion a year 
in the 1973-82  decade and over $80 billion a year in 1980-82,  dropped 
to under a billion dollars in 1985. At the same time, U .S.  bank borrowing 
from abroad, which had averaged a little over $20 billion a year during 
1973-82  and almost $40 billion in  1980-82,  continued to average over 
$40 billion in 1983-85.  Thus, the United States was absorbing foreign 
capital through  U.S. banks, through  foreign purchases  of  Treasury 
securities, and through foreign purchases of other U.S. securities (table 
8.41). Most of the foreign purchases of U.S.  securities other than Trea- 
sury securities in the last couple of  years have been of bonds rather 
than stocks, although stocks predominated earlier (tables 8.42 and 8.43). 
The main sources of  these funds were Western European countries, 
especially the United Kingdom. 
The sources of  other U.S. borrowing, including purchases of  U.S. 
Treasury  securities and additions to U.S. bank liabilities other than 
foreign official assets, were more widely dispersed (table 8.44). In this 
case, too, the industrial countries have been the main sources of funds, 
but  among them, Japan, included  in  the other industrial  countries, 
played a larger role than in  purchases of  corporate bonds. The Car- 
ibbean centers are intermediaries, the origins of  whose funds are not 
reported. The rest of the U.S. borrowing, about a fifth, came mainly 
from the developing countries of Latin America and Asia. 
Changes in foreign official assets in the United States were relatively 
small on net balance in 1983-85, but there were significant shifts among 
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Table 8.41  Additions to Foreign Holdings of  U.S.  Assets, Annual Averages 
(billions of  dollars, current prices) 
1973  -82  1983-85 
U.S. Treasury securities 
Other U.S. securities 
+  2.6 
+ 3.3 
+ 17.4 
+  24.1 
~~~  ~ 
Source: Appendix, table 8.A.12. 
Table 8.42  Additions to Foreign Holdings of U.S.  Corporate Stocks and 
Bonds Other than Treasury Securities (millions of  dollars, current 
prices) 








Source: Appendix, table 8.A.  13. 
Table 8.43  Foreign Purchases of  U.S.  Bonds Other than Treasury Securities, 
1983-85  Annual Average, by Country (billions of  dollars, 
current prices) 
Purchases 
Total  20.6 
Germ  any  1.4 
Switzerland  1.7 
U.K.  13.8 
Japan  2.5 
Source: Appendix, table 8.A.13. 
Table 8.44  Purchases of  U.S.  Treasury Securities and Additions to Foreign 
Liabilities of  U.S.  Banks, 1983-85  Annual Averages, by Country 
(billions of  dollars, current prices) 
Purchases and Additions 
Total 
Industrial countries 
Western  Europe 
Canada 
Other 
Caribbean banking centers 
Other countries 
Of which OPEC 
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Table 8.45  Changes in Foreign Official Assets in the United States, Annual 
Averages (billions of dollars, current prices) 
1974-78  1979-82  1983  -85 
Total  21.1  2.5  2.5 
Industrial countries  13.0  -  9.6  4.0 
OPEC members  6.5  9.8  -6.4 
Other countries  I .5  2.4  4.9 
Source: Appendix, table 8.A.  14. 
Since the collapse of oil prices, OPEC countries have been drawing 
down reserves in the United States while the industrial countries and 
the developing countries have been increasing them. In contrast, in the 
four years before, OPEC countries had been increasing their official 
reserve holdings in the United States by almost $10 billion a year and 
the industrial countries had been reducing theirs just about as fast. In 
the years after the first oil shock, all three groups of  countries were 
adding to the official reserves held in the United States. 
The collapse of U.S.  bank lending during the last three years includes 
very different behavior toward industriel and developing countries (ta- 
ble 8.46). Lending to developed countries changed little, but with re- 
spect to the developing countries of Latin America and Asia the United 
States turned from net lending to net repayment of debt. 
Over longer periods, the concentration of  the growth of  debt in a 
very few years becomes evident: almost two-thirds of the total since 
the first oil shock was extended during 1981 and 1982, and that pattern 
was repeated in almost all the borrowing countries (table 8.47). Then 
the next period, 1983-85,  saw reductions of 80-85  percent in the rate 
at which U.S. banks were extending credit, and that pattern too was 
repeated in each of the individual countries. 
Table 8.46  Changes in Claims on Foreigners Reported by U.S. Banks, by 
Area (billions of  dollars, current prices) 
1983  1984  1985 
Total  -  29.9  -  11.1  -  .7 
Industrial countries  -8.8  -8.4  -7.3 
Caribbean banking centers  -6.7  -  .7  -  .2 
Other areas  ~  14.4  -  2.0  +6.8 
Latin America  -9.3  -1.1  +4.7 
Asia  -4.6  -  .8  + 1.7 
Source: Appendix, table 8.A. 15. 
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Table 8.47  Changes in Claims on  Foreigners Reported by  U.S. Banks, by 
Areas, Annual Averages (billions of  dollars, current prices) 
1976-80  1981-82  1983-85 
Total  -27.9  -97.6  -  13.9 
Industrial countries  -  10.8  -41.3  -8.2 
Western Europe  n.a.  -33.6  -4.9 
U.K.  -4.2  -  21.6  -  3.3 
Other  n.a.  -  12.0  -  1.6 
Canada  n.a.  -  3.8  -  1.0 
Japan  n.a.  -  2.8  -  1.7 
Caribbean banking centers  -  6.8  -23.5  -2.5 
Other Areas  -  10.4  -  32.8  -  3.2 
OPEC  -  1.5  -4.0  -  .6 
Latin America  -  6.2  -  24.6”  -  1.9a 
Asia  -2.3  -  7.4a  -  1.2a 
Other  -  .4  -  .9  -.I 
Source: Appendix, table 8.A. 15. 
Nore: (-)  = increase in U.S. Assets 
aIncluding OPEC. 
8.6  Conclusion 
The United States has gone through several cycles in the state of its 
foreign investment account. It was a borrower and international debtor 
before World War I, first a lender and then a refuge for foreign capital 
between the wars, the world’s major lender and creditor after World 
War 11, and, in the last few years, a borrower again and, according to 
the official accounts, even a net debtor. Most foreign investment in the 
United  States has always been portfolio investment, although direct 
investment has been growing rapidly in recent years, while most U.S. 
investment abroad has typically  been direct investment. The major 
episodes of foreign portfolio investment by the United States have not 
been happy ones. One was the intergovernment lending during World 
War  I, eventually  written  off. A  second was the burst  of lending to 
Latin America in the late 1920s, a good part of which ended in default. 
And the third was the large international lending of the period after the 
first oil crisis, much of which is of questionable standing now. 
The long period  of  U.S. borrowing before 1900 does not  seem to 
have  brought  enough  foreign capital  into the  United  States for the 
transfer of resources involved to have made a great difference in the 
long-run growth of the country. The role of foreign capital appears to 
have been that of accommodating  capital needs for sharp bursts in U.S. 
growth or in the growth of  particular sectors, especially capital-intensive 
ones, until  domestic saving caught up with capital formation. If  the 515  U.S. Changing Patterns of International Investment 
irregularity of  capital requirements was an intrinsic feature of  rapid 
growth, the inflow of foreign capital was more important than its size 
would indicate. 
U.S. direct investment abroad began while the United  States was 
still an overall borrower and debtor, as the technological leaders among 
U.S. manufacturing firms pioneered in the technique of exploiting their 
firm advantages by producing in other countries. The major expansion 
in U.S. direct investment took place in the 1950s and 1960s, as U.S. 
firms took advantage of the great advances in communication and trans- 
portation to spread their production activities around the world. The 
peak in the stock of  foreign assets relative  to domestic assets was 
probably reached during the early  1970s, although the share of  their 
exports that multinational U.  S. manufacturing firms produced abroad 
continued to increase after that. 
The bulk of U.S. direct investment abroad has always been in goods 
production. However, there was a brief period in the 1920s in which 
almost all of U.S.  investment in public utilities was concentrated, pre- 
sumably a reflection of the U.S. lead in telephone systems and electric 
power  production and distribution. Within the production of  goods 
there has been a shift away from primary production, between a third 
and a half of the total in the  1950s, to manufacturing, which reached 
its peak share in the late  1960s or early  1970s. Since then there has 
been growth in the trade and services sector, the share of which roughly 
doubled between the mid- 1950s and the mid- 1980s and reached almost 
a third of total direct investment. Most of this growth is in wholesale 
trade and finance, with other services, even including oil field services, 
still less than 5 percent of U.S. direct investment abroad in 1985. 
Using foreign production to retain  their  competitiveness in  world 
markets,  U.S.  multinational  manufacturing  firms have  been  able to 
retain a constant share of world exports of manufactures over the last 
fifteen or twenty years, while the share of the United States as a country 
has fallen sharply. What sustained the share of U.S. multinationals was 
the growth in their exports from locations outside the United States 
to the point that almost half of their exports now originate from their 
foreign production. 
The comparative advantage of  both the United States and its mul- 
tinational firms is concentrated in chemicals, machinery, and transport 
equipment, to  judge by export performance. The multinationals’ share 
is large relative to that of  the United  States in chemicals, electrical 
machinery, and transport equipment, but the share of the United States 
as a country is greater in nonelectrical machinery. Among more nar- 
rowly defined industries, the multinationals’ comparative advantage is 
strongest in industries with heavy investments in advertising and R&D. 
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the United States as a country, explains the comparative advantage of 
U.S. multinationals to an even greater degree. 
Over the last quarter century, U.S. affiliates in foreign countries have 
changed their operations in several respects. One is that they  have 
become more dependent on the U.S. market. However, they still sell 
mainly in their host-country markets, and what they do export goes 
mainly to countries other than the United States. Exports to the U.S. 
market are only 14 percent of their total sales. 
There has been an increase in the proportion of affiliates in which 
parents own less than a majority share, although that trend has at least 
slowed. Affiliates in the most technologically advanced industries con- 
tinue to be majority owned in most cases, presumably because sharing 
of  ownership would  erode the very  advantages that make direct in- 
vestment profitable. 
While the flow of direct investment from the United States has slowed, 
there has recently been a large inflow of foreign direct investment into 
the United  States, roughly  tripling the share of foreign-owned  com- 
panies in the United States since 1950, doubling it in the last decade, 
and reaching to about three-quarters of the value of U.S. investment 
abroad if  those book value figures are taken literally. They probably 
exaggerate  the size of inward direct investment relative  to outward 
investment because so much of the inward investment has occurred in 
recent years. 
While foreign-owned firms accounted for only about 3.5 percent of 
total U.S. employment after all the recent growth in foreign investment, 
the shares in  manufacturing  and wholesale  trade were considerably 
higher.  Within  manufacturing  there was also considerable variation, 
with foreign firms accounting  for almost 40 percent of chemical industry 
employment, but in all the other industries for less than  10 percent. 
The foreign shares in service industries, aside from wholesale trade, 
increased, but remained below 3 percent. To some extent, these figures 
reflect U.S.  comparative advantage in service industry production, but 
the fact that U.S. companies’ direct investment in foreign service in- 
dustries is not itself very large suggests that it may be difficult to carry 
firm advantages in these industries across national borders. 
The sources of these foreign investment flows into the United States 
continue to be  mainly  European countries, particularly  the  United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands. However, there has been some increase 
in the flow from Japan, mainly into wholesale trade. Most of that is 
probably connected with exporting from and importing to Japan rather 
than with wholesale trading among U.S. companies. 
Aside from the increased flow of direct investment into the United 
States in recent years, there have been major shifts in the U.S. inter- 
national capital position,  stemming largely from changes in portfolio 517  U.S. Changing Patterns of International Investment 
investment. The United States became a very large capital importer in 
1983-85  as U.S. banks reduced their net lending to insignificant amounts 
overall and foreign countries added greatly to their holdings not only 
of  direct investment but also of U.S. Treasury securities, other U.S. 
securities, and deposits in  U.S. banks. Most of  the flows have been 
from Europe, as in the case of  direct investment, but Japan has also 
become an important investor, particularly in U.  S.  Treasury securities. 
The growth of U.S. bank claims on foreigners was concentrated in 
a very short period after the second rise in oil prices, with most being 
accumulated in 1981 and 1982. That concentration is unpleasantly rem- 
iniscent of  the concentration of portfolio investment in the late 1920s, 
but there has already been a substantial reduction in those claims in 
1985 alone. 
Appendix 
Tables 8.A.1-8.A.15 are on pages 518-42. Table 8.A.1  U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, by Industry of Affiliate (millions of  dollars, current prices) 




Extract. & integ. 
ref. & ext. 
Petrol.  ref. & 








Oil & gas field 
service 
PRIMARY,  incl. all 
petrol. 
PRIMARY,  excl. 
petrol. ref., 
dist. & serv. 
Manufacturing 
Mfg., incl. petrol. 
ref. 
Construction 
TOTAL  GOODS, 




































































































































































4,995 GOODS,  excl. 
petrol. transp., 
trade & serv. 
Public utilities & 
transp., excl. 
petrol. 
Public utilities & 
transp., incl. 
petrol. transp. 
GOODS  & PUBL. 
UTIL.,  incl. 
all petrol. 
GOODS  & PUBL. 
UTIL.,  excl. 
petrol. trade, & 
service 









Trade, incl. petrol. 





bank), ins., & RE 












2,333  2,322  2,427  2,273  2,186  2,260  2,145  1,425 
3,671  3,757  4,167  3,921  4,676”  3,364  3,343  n.a. 























23,822  21,790  21,278  20,788  14,011  3,427  1,156  542 








































463h Table 8.A.1  (continued) 
Of which Neth 
Of  which holding 
Antilles 
comp. 
Insur., RE, & 
other finance 
Insur. & RE 
Other Services, excl. 
petrol. 
TRADE  & SERV., 
excl. petrol. 
TRADE  & SERV., 
excl. petrol., 
Neth., Antilles, & 
Holding cos. 
TRADE  & SERV., 
incl. petrol., 
excl. Neth. Ant. 




















































































1,424  1,328 
1,368  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 











7,528 Sources: 1982-85:  U.S. Department of Commerce 1986a, table 37; 1977: U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1981; 1966: U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1975, table A- 
15; 1929-57:  U.S. Dept. of  Commerce 1960, tables 5 and 6, pp. 93, 94. 
%dudes  gasoline service stations. 
bExcludes gasoline service stations. 
CHotels, advertising & other business services, motion pictures, and all other, including inactive. 
dlncluded with other services. 
CFigure comparable to 1957 is 54,799. 
Tigure comparable to 1950 is 26,278. 
glncluded with other finance. 
hIncludes banking. Table 8.A.2  Distribution of  Exports of Manufactures by the United States and 
the World, by  Detailed Industry, 1966, 1977, and 1982 
All manufacturing industries 
Foods and kindred products 
Grain-mill. & bakery prod 
Beverages 
Other food products 
Drugs 




Primary iron and steel 
Primary nonferrous 
Fabricated metal prod. 
Nonelectrical machinery 
Farm and garden mach. 
Construction mach. 
Office and comp. mach. 




Other electrical rnach. 
Motor vehicles & equip. 
Other transport equip. 
Other manufacturing 
Tobacco products 
Textiles & clothing 
Paper & pulp 
Paper products 
Printing & publishing 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 









1966  1977  1982 























































































































































































































































Source: U.N. Tapes. Table 8.A.3  Industry Distribution of  Exports of Manufactures by U.S. 
Multinationals, by Detailed Industry, 1977 and 1982 
1977  1982  198211977 
All manufacturing industries 
Foods and kindred products 
Grain-mill. & bakery prod. 
Beverages 
Other food products 
Drugs 




Primary iron and steel 
Primary nonferrous 
Fabricated metal prod. 
Nonelectrical Machinery 
Farm and garden mach. 
Construction mach. 
Office and comp. mach. 




Other electrical mach. 
Motor vehicles & equip. 
Other transport equip. 
Other manufacturing 
Tobacco products 
Textiles & clothing 
Pulp & paper 
Paper products 
Printing & publishing 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
































































































































Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce 1981, tables III.H2 and II.TI, and 1985f, tables 
III.E2 and II.Pl. 
Note: Multinutionuh refers to manufacturing industry parents and majority-owned af- 
filiates in manufacturing industries. 
"Included in other nonelectrical machinery. 
bIncludes farm and garden machinery. 
Clncluded  in other manufacturing. 
dlncludes tobacco products. Table 8.A.4  Industry Share in Exports of Manufactures, United States and U.S. 
Multinationals Relative to the World, by  Detailed Industry, 1966, 
1977, and 1982 




the World  U.S. Relative to the World 
I966  1977  1982  I977  1982 
Foods and kindred products 
Grain-mill. & bakery prod. 
Beverages 
Other food products 
Drugs 




Primary iron and steel 
Primary nonferrous 
Fabricated metal prod. 
Nonelectrical machinery 
Farm and garden mach. 
Construction mach. 
Office and comp. mach. 




Other electrical mach. 
Motor vehicles & equip. 
Other transport equip. 
Other Manufacturing 
Tobacco products 
Textiles & clothing 
Pulp & paper 
Paper products 
Printing & publishing 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 













































































































































































































Sources: Tables 8.A.2 and 8.A.3. 
“Included in other nonelectrical machinery. 
bIncludes farm and garden machinery. 
CIncluded  in other manufacturing. 
dIncludes tobacco products. Table 8.A.5  Industry Shares in Exports by U.S. Multinationals Relative to 
Shares in U.S. Exports of Manufactures, by Detailed Industry, 
1977 and 1982 
1977  1982 
Foods and kindred products 
Grain-mill. & bakery prod. 
Beverages 
Other food products 
Drugs 




Primary iron and steel 
Primary nonferrous 
Fabricated metal prod. 
Nonelectrical machinery 
































Farm and garden mach.  a  .85 
Construction mach. 
Office and comp. mach. 




Other electrical mach. 
Motor vehicles & equip. 
Other transport equip. 
Other manufacturing 
Tobacco products 
Textiles & clothing 
Pulp & paper 
Paper products 
Printing & publishing 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 





















































Sources: Tables 8.A.2 and 8.A.3. 
Nofe:  Mulfinafionals  refers to manufacturing industry parents and affiliates in manufac- 
turing industries. 
“Included in other nonelectrical machinery. 
blncludes farm and garden machinery; comparable 1982 ratio was .47. 
CIncluded  in other manufacturing. 
‘JIncludes tobacco products; comparable 1982 ratio was .86. Table 8.A.6  R&D Expenditures by Manufacturing Parents and Relation to 
Parent Sales, 1977 (millions of  dollars) 
R&D 
R&D  Expend. as 
Expend.  Sales  % of  Sales 
Total Manufacturing 
Foods and kindred products 
Grain-mill. & bakery prod 
Beverages 
Other food products 
Drugs 




Primary iron and steel 
Primary nonferrous 
Fabricated metal prod. 
Nonelectrical machinery 
Farm and garden mach. 
Construction mach. 
Office and comp. mach. 




Other electrical mach. 
Motor vehicles & equip. 
Other transport equip. 
Other manufacturing 
Tobacco products 
Textiles & clothing 
Pulp & paper 
Paper products 
Printing & publishing 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
































































































































Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1981. 
alncluded in “other chemicals.” 
hlncludes “agricultural chemicals.” Table 8.A.7  Sales and Exports by  U.S. Majority-Owned Amliates (millions of 
dollars) 
Total Sales 
1957  1966  1977  1982  1983  1984 
All Industries 


































































































1957  1966  1977  1982  1983  1984 
All Industries 

































































































3,529 Table 8.A.7  (continued) 
Exports to the U.S 
1957  1966  1977  1982  1983  1984 
All Industries 






































































76,814  88,956 
537  583 
995  1,052 
30,514  31,780 
15,854  16,048 
14,660  15,732 
3 1,258  39,858 
30  29 
I44  I79 
6,387  7,157 
6,297  7,122 
90  35 
5,984  7,277 
966  1,040 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce 1960, tables 22  and 23; 1975, table L-I; 1981, 
table III.H2; 1985f, table III.E2; 1986d. table 35; 1986c, table 35. 
”Excluding trade and finance. 
bIncluded with services. 
Clncluding  construction. 
dIncluding  agriculture, forestry, fishing, and construction. 
‘The  division of sales between local sales and exports was not reported by companies 
in “finance, insurance, and real estate.” Table 8.A.8  Sales of Majority-Owned Affiliates as Percentage of  Sales of All Affiliates 
~~ 
1966  1977  1982 
Developed  Developed  Developed 








Soaps, cleansers, etc. 
Machinery 
Office & computing mach. 
Radio, TV, & commun. eq. 
Electronic comp. & access. 
Instruments & related prod. 












































75.4  84.2 
58.8  87.5 
54.6  48.3 
72.8  93.4 
80.5  71.0 
93.8  86.0 
96.6  88.6 
86.3  77.8 
94.7  97.5 
94.1  77.6 
80.5  95.3 
89.2  76.8 
19.5  29.4 
80.8  75.3 
75.6  79.5  [  71.6  60.5 
75.6d  53.9d 







































Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce 1975, tables 5-3,  5-4, 5-18 and L-3; 1981, tables II.F6 and III.F6; and 1985f, 
tables II.D4 and III.D4. 
aIncluded with “other industries.” 
bBased on income in place of sales. The sales figures for majority-owned affiliates in the source appear to be incorrect. 
=Suppressed observations estimated by the author. 
dExcluding banks. Table 8.A.9  Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, by Industry of  Affiliate (millions of dollars) 
1985  1984  1983  1982  1981  1980  1977  1974  1966  1960  1950 
Total 
Agriculture, forestry, & fishing 
Mining 
Petroleum, total 
Extraction & integ. ref. & ext. 
Petrol. refin. & petrol. & coal prod. 
Tankers, pipelines & storagea 
Distribution & marketingb 
oil  & gas field service 
PRIMARY,  incl. all petrol. 
PRIMARY,  excl. petrol., transp., 







TOTAL  GOODS,  incl. all petrol. 
GOODS,  excl. petrol.,  transp., 
dist., & service 
Public util. &tramp., excl. petrol. 
Public util. & transp., incl. petrol. 
GOODS  & PUB. UTIL.,  incl. all petrol. 

























164,583  137.061 
1,150  1,148 
3,920  1,928 
25,400  18.209 
21,913  15,385 
28  31 
538  587 
1,930  1,202 
990  1,005 





























































60  1 
14,293 
34,595  26,512  9,054  6,910  3,391 
n.a.  31c 
n.a.  427  q  n.a.  6,174 
n.a.  180 
n.a. 
n.a.  6,812 
6,573  6,354  1,740  1,238  405 
12,362  n.a.  6,632 
33,011  14,030  8,242  3,789  2,611  1,138 
10,439  n.a.  2,672 
6,995  n.a.  1,093 
4,477 
36c 
955  n.a. 
14,622  n.a. 
522  n.a. 
47,826  n.a.  15,090  I 
83,151  69,832  64,925  59,285  45,895  n.a.  14,910 
1,633  1,572  1,379  1,103  774  n.a.  347 
2,171  2,159  1,836  1,496  1,142  n.a.  n.a. 
88,242  74,198  69,721  63,134  48,600  n.a.  15,437 
85,322  71,991  66,761  60,781  47,037  n.a.  15,257 Trade, excl. petrol. 
Wholesale,  excl. petrol. 
Wholesale,  incl. petrol. 
Retail 
Trade, incl. petrol. 
Finance & other serv., excl. petrol. 
Banking 




Other services, excl. petrol. 
Other industries 
TRADE  & SERV.,  excl. petrol. 
TRADE  & SERV.,  excl. petrol. 
TRADE  & SERV.,  incl. petrol. 
& hold cos. 





















































20,537  15,210  n.a.  4,578 
16,012  11,560  7,237  4,153  739 
17,377  12,522  n.a. 
21,902  16,172  n.a. 
4,525  3,650  n.a.  425 
2,072  1,810  1,065 
16,115  12,673 
1,330  1,089  302 
45,579  34,446  I 1,076 
1,357d  714d  1,25Ie  784e 
44,535  33,589  7,269 
45,900  34,551  n.a. 
Sources: 1981-85:  U.S. Department of Commerce 1986a, table 23; 1980: U.S. Department of  Commerce 1985b, table 34; 1974: U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1976, table A-4. These data have been revised in the source listed for 1977 and earlier years, but we used  this source for its superior 
detail. 1950, 1960, 1966, 1977: U.S. Department of  Commerce 1984b, tables  1 and 17. 
alncludes gasoline service stations. 
bWholesale only. 
%vestment  in unincorporated  affiliates in agriculture and construction is combined in the source. We  assumed that half was in agriculture and half 
was in construction. 
dlncluding  agriculture,  mining, construction, public utilities and transportation, retail trade, and other services. 
‘Same coverage as note d, plus wholesale trade. Table 8.A.10  Employment of Nonbank U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Corporations, by Industry of Affiliate (thousands) 
1984  1983  1982  1981  1980  1979  1978  1977  1974 
All Industries 




Food & kindred prod. 
Chemicals 
Primary & fabric. metals 
Machinery, excl. elect. 
Elect. mach. & equip. 
Transport. equip. 
Other manuf. 
PRIMARY  PRODUCTION 
Construction 
Public utilities & transportation 
Wholesale trade 
Retail trade 





GOODS,  PUBLIC UTIL.  & TRANSP. 
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Sources: Shea 1986; Howenstine 1985; U.S. Department of Commerce 1984a, table F-1; U.S. Department of  Commerce 1985~.  table 
F-I; U.S. Department of Commerce 1976, table L-I. 
aBanking: 26 thousand. Table S.A.11  Foreign Direct Investment Position in the United States by 
Industry and Country (billions of dollars, current prices) 
1985  1984  1983  1982  1981  1980 







































































































































































































































































































Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce 1986a and earlier articles in the same series. Table 8.A.12  U.S. International Capital Transactions, 1960-85 (millions of dollars, current prices) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1%7  I968  I969  1970  1971  1972 
U.S. AND FOREIGN 
ASSETS,  NET  -  1,805 
U.S. ASSETS  ABROAD, 
NET (increase1 
capital outflow 
(-1)  -  4.09 
U.S. official 
reserve assets, 
net  2,145 
U.S. government 
assets, other than 
official reserve 
assets, net  -1,100 
net  -  5, I44 
Direct investment  -2,940 
Foreign securities  -  663 
U.S. private assets, 




concerns  -  394 
U.S. claims 








-  5,235 
~  2,653 
-  762 
-  558 
-2,263  -4,053  -5,917  -4.974  -3,660  -2,378 
-4,174  -7,270  -9,560  -5,716  -7,321  -9,757 
1,535  378  171  1,225  570  53 
-  1,085  -  1,662  -  1,680  -  1,605  -  1,543  -2,423 
-4,623  -5,986  -8,050  -5,336  -6,347  -7,386 
-2,851  -3,483  -3,760  -5,011  -5,418  -4,805 
-969  -1.105  -677  -759  -720  -1,308 
-354  157  -1.108  341  -442  -779 
-1,148  -1,261  -450  -1,556  -2,505 
-1.049  +1,117 
~  10,977  -  11,585 
-870  -1.179 
-2.274  -2,200 
-7,833  -8,206 
-5.295  -5,960 
-  1.569  -  1.549 
-1,203  -126 
-  2,978 
-9,337 
2,481 
-  1,589 
- 10,229 
-7,590 
-  1,076 
-  596 
+ 10,495  +6,964 
-  12,475  -  14,497 
2,349  -4 
-  1,884  -  1.568 
-  12.940  -  12,925 
-7.618  -7,747 
-1,113  -618 
-  1.229  -  1,054 
93  233  -495  233  -570  -967  -2,980  -3,506 FOREIGN  Assets in 
the UNITED  STATES. 
NET (increase1 
capital inflow (+))  2,294  2,705  1,911  3,217  3,643  742  3,661  7.379  9,928  12,702  6,359  22,970  21.461 
Foreign official 
assets in the 
U.S.,  net  1,473  765  1,270  1,986  1.660  134  -672  3,451  -774  -1.301  6,908  26,879  10,475 
US.  government 
U.S.  Treasury 
securities  655  233  1,410  803  434  -  134  -1,548  2,222  -798  -2,269  9,411  26,578  8,213 
Other  -  -  -I  12  -2  -7  21  39  29  -  74  28  -8  257 
securities  655  233  1,409  816  432  -  141  -  1,527  2,261  -169  -2,343  9,439  26,570  8,470 
Other U.S. 
government 
liabilities  215  25  152  429  298  65  I I3  83  -  15  251  -456  -510  I82 
U.S. liabilities 





603  508  -291  742  930  210  742  1,106  10  792  -2,075  819  1,638 
-  I85  -  -  official assets 
Other foreign assets 
in the United States, 
net  821  1,939  641  1,231  1,983  607  4,333  3,928  10,703  14,002  -550  -3,909  10,986 
Direct investment  315  31 1  346  231  322  415  425  698  807  1,263  1,464  367  949 
securities  -  364  151  -66  -149  -146  -131  -356  -135  136  -  68  81  -  24  -  39 
U.S. Securities 
U.S. Treasury 
other than U.S. 
Treasury 
securities  282  324  134  287  -85  -358  906  1,016  4,414  3,130  2,189  2,289  4,507 Table 8.A.12  (continued) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  I966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
792  2,014  369  815 
U.S. liabilities to 
unaffiliated foreigners 
reported by  U.S. 
nonbanking 
concerns  -  90  226  -110  -37  75  178  476  584  1.475 
U.S. liabilities 
reported by U.S. 
banks, not 
included 
elsewhere  678  928  336  898  1,818  503  2,882  1,765  3,871  8.886  -6.298  -6,911  4,754 
Allocations of special 
Stutisticul 
-  -  -  -  -  867  717  710  drawing rights  -  -  -  -  - 
discrepancy  -1,019  -989  -1,124  -360  -907  -457  629  -205  438  -1,516  -219  -9.779  -1.879 
1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
U.S. AND FOREIGN 
ASSETS,  NET  -4,486  -504  -24,033  -14,751  + 16,534  +2,906  -25,579  --28.006  -27.709  -27,195  +35,474  +79,128  t94.670 
U.S. ASSETS  ABROAD, 
NET (increase/ 
capital outflow 
( -  1)  -22,874  -34,745  -39,703  -51,269  -34,785  -61,130  -64,331  -86,118  -111,031  -121,273  -50,022  -23,639  -32,436 
U.S. official 
reserve assets, 
net  158  -  1,467  -849  -2,558  -375  732  -1,133  -8,155  -5,175  -4,965  -1,196  -3,131  -3,858 
assets, other than 
official reserve 
U.S. government 
assets, net  -2,644  366  -3,474  -4,214  -3,693  -4.660  -3,746  -5,162  -5,097  -6,131  -5.005  -5,523  -2,824 U.S. private assets, 
net  -  20,388 
Direct investment  -  1 1,353 
Foreign securities  -671 
unaffiliated foreigners 
U.S. claims on 
-  33,643 
-9,052 
-  1,854 
-3,221 
-  35,380 
-  14,244 
-  6,247 
-  I .357 
-44,498 
-  I 1,949 
-8,885 
-  2.296 
-30,717 
-  1 1,890 
-5,460 
-  1.940 
-  57,202 
-  16,056 
-  3.626 
-  3.853 
-  59,453 










-  1.181 
110,177 
2,369 
-  8,102 
6.626 
-  43,82  I 
-  373 
-7,007 
-6,513 
~  14,986 
-  3,858 
-  5,082 
5.08  1 
-  25.754 
-  18,752 










FOREIGN  ASSETS IN 
THE UNITED  STATES, 
NET (increase1 
capital inflow (+  )) 
Foreign official assets 
in the U.S., net 
U.S. government 
securities 












-5,980  -19,516  -13,532  -21,368  -11,427  -33,667  -26,213  -46.838  -84,175  -111.070  -29,928  -11,127  -691 





-  13,665 
-21,972 
-  22,435 




-  1.324 
-841 
6,026  10,546  7,027  17,693  36,816  15,497  4,960  3,593  5,%8 
















-  694 
6,972 
-  476 
4,690 
13 
-  546 
-  295  p -666  463 
2,476  -40  936  301  1,517  4,627  1.400  615  -  338  605  725  436  438 
4,126  5,818  -2,158  %9  773  5,551  7,213  -  159  -3,670  -1,747  545  555  522 Table 8.A.12  (continued) 
1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  I981  1982  1983  1984  I985 
Other foreign 
Other foreign assets 
official assets  323  254  2,104  2,205  2,105  1,430  1,135  3,145  2,646  -350  -1,798  -2.657  -1,488 
in the U.S.,  net  12,362  23,696  8,643  18,826  14,503  30,358  52,416  42,615  78.362  90,486  79,527  99,730  128,430 
Direct investment  2,800  4,760  2,603  4,347  3,728  7,897  11,877  16,918  25.195  13,792  11,946  25,359  17,856 
US.  Treasury 
U.S. securities 
securities  -216  697  2,590  2,783  534  2,178  4,960  2,645  2,946  7,052  8,721  23,059  20.500 
other than US. 
Treasury 
securities  4,041 
unaffiliated foreigners 
reported by U.S. 
U.S. liabilities to 
378  2,503  1,284  2,437  2,254  1,351  5.457  7,176  6,392  8,636  12,759  50,859 
nonbanking 
concerns  1,035  1,844  319  -578  1,086  1,889  1,621  6,852  917  -2,383  -118  4,704  -1.172 
U.S. liabilities 
reported by  U.S. 
banks, not 
included 
elsewhere  4,702  16,017  628  10,990  6,719  16,141  32,607  10,743  42,128  65,633  50,342  33.849  40,387 
Allocations of special 
Sluristical 
drawing rights  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.139  1.152  1,093  -  -  -  - 
discrepancy  -2.654  -1.458  5,917  10,544  -2,023  12,521  25.431  24,982  20,276  36,325  11,130  27.338  23.W6 
Source: Krueger 1986, table  1. Table 8.A.13  Foreign Purchases of U.S. Corporate Stocks and Corporate and 
Other Bonds, excluding Treasury Securities and Transactions of 
Foreign Official Agencies (millions of dollars, current prices) 
I985  1984  1983  1982  1981 
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1,691 
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5,056 
3,655 











66  1 
96 




Sources; 1983-85:  Krueger  1986, table 6; others from earlier articles in the same series 
Notes: (+) = net foreign purchases; (-)  = net foreign sales Table 8.A.14  Foreign Purchases of  U.S. Treasury Securities and Additions to Liabilities Reported by U.S. Banks (millions of dollars, current 
prices) 








net  -  1,324  3,037  5,795  3,318  5,430 
Industrial 
Members 
countries  I,  178  463  10.284  -6,506  -  11,544 
of 
OPEC  -6,599  -4,304  -8,283  7,291  13,581 
Other 















15,442  -  13,757  33,293  36,656  18,073  6,336 
914  -21,151  34,293  28,766  3,887  -1,040 
12,769  5,543  -1,137  6,351  9,581  6,881 




85  3 incl. 
elsewhere  60,887 
Industrial 
c'ntries  35,988 
Western 
Eur.  10,964 
Canada  777 
Other  24,247 
Caribbean 
banking 
centers  1 1,287 




OPEC"  2,464 
By areab 
Latin 
America  5,361 
Asia  5,538 
Africa  1,079 
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Sources:  1983-85:  Krueger 1985 and 1986, tables B and 9; others from earlier articles in the same series. 
Nores: (+) = credits, increase in foreign assets; (-)  = debits, decrease in foreign assets. 
aPrevious to 1981, oil-exporting countries. 
bOPEC members included in area totals from 1981 through 1985; oil-exporting countries excluded from area totals before 1981. Table 8.A.15  Changes in Claims on Foreigners Reported by U.S. Banks, by Area (millions of dollars, current prices) 









Caribbean banking centers 
Other Areas 






-691  -11,127 
-7,291  -8,384 
-6,445  -6,411 
-  4,450  -  7,994 
-  1,995  1,583 
1,319  -349 
-  2,659  -  663 
494  -961 
200  -717 
6,800  -2,026 
1,321  124 
4,702  -1,122 
1,713  -  761 
385  280 
-  -  423 
-  29,928  -  I1 1,070 
-8,846  -49,183 
-  1,868  -  43,053 
2,527  -  26,076 
-4,395  -  16,977 
-3,905  -3,241 
-  1,752  -  1,591 
-  1,321  -  1,298 
-  6,696  -  25,462 
-  14,386  -  36,425 
-3,105  -5,698 
-  9,269  -  26,344 
-  4,567  -  9,499 
-  570  -  867 
20  285 
-  84,175 
-  33,464 
-  24,092 
-  17,094 
-  6,998 
-4,352 
-4,019 
-  1,001 
-21,475 
-  29,236 
-  2,302 




-46,838  -26,213 
-  14,255  -  13,906 
-2,812  -  10,009 
-  16,845  2,335 
-  15,738  -  14,642 
-  1,684  241 
-  14,054  -  14.883 
-  8,870  -  11,436 
-4,407  -2,795 
-  303  -  99 
-474  -553 
-33,631 
-  18,107 
-4,610 
-  1,930 
-  13,594 
-  3,472 
-  10,122 
-  7,045 
-  2,879 
-  109 
-  89 
-  11,427 
-3,125 
-  1,942 
-  5,825 
-  2,477 
-  906 
-  1,571 
-  609 
-  928 
-  111 
77 
-21,368 
-  4,507 
-  1,799 
- 11,518 
-5,343 
-  1,712 
-3,631 
-  3,095 
-  366 
59 
-  229 
Notes:  (+) = credits, decrease in U.S. assets; (-)  = debits, increase in U.S. assets. 
sPrevious to 1981, oil-exporting countries. 
bOPEC members included in area totals from 1981 through 1985; oil-exporting countries excluded from area totals before 1981. 543  U.S. Changing Patterns of  International Investment 
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2.  Mario Schimberni 
Investing to and from the United States 
I have been asked to explain why European businessmen are interested 
in entering, operating, and investing in the U.S. market. The expla- 
nation is complex and associated with all the components of a global 
strategy. Briefly, for a European company a presence in the United 
States is an important step toward competing successfully with Amer- 
ican firms in the world market. 
We  live in a low- or no-growth economy, where markets are more 
competitive, partly due to the presence of new competitors, sometimes 
from new geographical areas or from industries outside the ranks of 
traditional rivals. Being present in the United States may enable us to 
acquire useful competitive factors and be successful in this context. 
The 1980s have been characterized by increasing interrelations among 
the various economies. If we measure the degree of openness of an 
economy by the incidence of imports and exports on GNP, we observe 
that it rose from 8 percent to 30 percent in the OECD countries between 
1970 and 1985. 
This indicator is not sufficient, however, to fully describe the inter- 
nationalization  process  in  economies and business strategies, which 
today is characterized by qualitative elements difficult to measure in 
monetary terms.  Traditionally, it was the industrial and commercial 
aspects of economic activity that were affected by the process of foi-eign 
openness, through the flows of imports and exports and direct invest- 
ments. Now the elements upstream from the market competition phase 
also take part in the internationalization process. For this reason it is 
more correct to speak of  “globalization.” 
In a global market, business can find market outlets perhaps with 
differentiated classes of users for its products, but also it can find (1) 
new financial opportunities in terms of markets, instruments, and cur- 546  Robert E. LipseylMario SchimberdRobert V.  Lindsay 
rencies of denomination;  and (2) new occasions for innovation, through 
forms of collaboration and interaction with other companies and with 
advanced research centers. This change in the objectives of interna- 
tionalization is also reflected in the greater diversification of available 
instruments. In contrast to the past, companies are going beyond the 
alternative between exports and  direct investments and  utilizing  a 
“continual” range of instruments that lend themselves to flexible use 
and rapid termination. 
Joint ventures, nonequity  collaboration  agreements between com- 
panies, minority shareholdings in firms that are strategic  from the stand- 
point of innovation and research, acquisitions, mergers: these are the 
instruments and opportunities available to global companies today. Eu- 
ropean businessmen have a growing interest in the American economy 
precisely because of the complex, diversified nature of the motivations 
and methods of the internationalization process. 
In addition to its continental “commercial” dimension, the American 
market is strategic because it offers a series of industrial, technological, 
scientific, distributional, financial, and managerial  resources. The ex- 
istence and accessibility of these resources have attracted European 
economic operators even during strong dollar periods, demonstrating 
that their interest is strategic and long range, not speculative or linked 
to short-term profits. 
We  may attempt to “quantify”  interest in the American economy 
by analyzing collaboration agreements, which have been a highly im- 
portant  flexible  instrument  at  the  service  of  corporate  “global 
requirements.” 
Out of  a broad sample of  1,883 agreements concluded during the 
1982-85  period, almost 50 percent included an American partner. In 
the electronic and pharmaceutical industries, the percentages were even 
higher: 55 percent and 68 percent, respectively. 
I describe, based on the experience of the Montedison Group, the 
significant  reasons  for this  interest.  We  begin  with  the  scientific- 
technological reason. 
Of the 1,883 agreements signed during the 1982-85  period, 41 percent 
were sought for reasons of R&D or technology transfer. The important 
role of the United States in this field of know-how diffusion is shown 
by the fact that out of 204 agreements in which there was a unilateral 
transfer of technology,  132 had  the United  States as a  source, with 
Europe and Japan as the principal  recipients. The American balance 
is strongly positive, Japan’s slightly positive, Europe’s negative. 
At the basis of these tendencies is the existence of a “system effect” 
that increases the efficiency with which each company, large or small, 
American or not, participates in the innovation process. At the foun- 
dation there is a high level of  scientific research, particularly that con- 547  U.S. Changing Patterns of International Investment 
ducted in university laboratories, but European universities  (and es- 
pecially Italian) are far away from these standards. 
The results of scientific and technological research are “transferred” 
from the university world to industry: the United States offers great 
possibilities and capacity for applying scientific progress. This is par- 
ticularly important in a phase like the present when innovation has a 
high concentration of  scientific knowledge, and the competitive posi- 
tion of a company depends to a great extent on the quantity and quality 
of scientific knowledge incorporated into its productive processes. 
The facility and rapidity with which ideas, information, and research 
results circulate, and the mobility of scientists from the university to in- 
dustry, enable most production organizations, even those of small di- 
mensions, to be involved in the innovation process at a high level. In other 
words, even small and midsize companies enter the innovation system 
and enrich it. This permits the association between high-quality research 
and the entrepreneurial flexibility and creativity of small business. 
The “system effect” lies precisely in the pervasiveness of scientific 
and technological progress, also boosted by (1) efficient mechanisms 
for financing innovation (like venture capital); and (2) the existence, in 
some cases, of physical facilities that institutionalize this intermingling 
of  the relationships  and communication channels which multiply in- 
novation (the case of science parks). 
A “system effect” of  this type is lacking in Italy and, I would say, 
in all of Europe. As a consequence, this limits innovation in the fabric 
of small and midsize firms characteristic of our economy. This limited 
capacity to generate product innovations has negative effects on com- 
petitiveness throughout the system. In Montedison we have sought to 
overcome these structural deficiencies in two ways. On the one hand, 
we have consolidated our presence and our network of contacts here 
in  the United  States. For example, we have concluded two research 
agreements, the first with the creation of Keramont (joint venture with 
MER) in the field of advanced ceramics, the second with the acquisition 
of  Plant Cell Research Institute of Palo Alto in the field of biotech- 
nology. On the other hand, we are working on two projects: the first 
creates together with other European firms a scientific research center 
on the American model of MIT; the second founds a liasion agency to 
organize joint ventures between small Italian firms and U.S. high-tech 
companies. 
A second reason for European interest in the United States is of a 
financial nature.  The American  capital  market  has  some important 
characteristics that in Europe are present only to a limited degree (or 
totally nonexistent). 
1. Magnitude. The New York Stock Exchange has a ratio of capi- 
talization to GNP of 50 percent, while the Milan Stock Exchange has 548  Robert E. Lipsey/Mario Schimberni/Robert V.  Lindsay 
a ratio of 18 percent. This great magnitude also concerns the secondary 
market, where it is possible  to make large unit  transactions without 
upsetting the market. An important consequence of these character- 
istics is stability. The European capital market is still  segmented by 
the various  national regulations,  and we cannot speak of integrated 
European financial structures. 
2. The number and type of  intermediaries. The U.S. market is en- 
dowed with a diversified system of financial intermediation: the activity 
of collecting deposits and granting loans is accompanied by forms and 
channels of intermediation  sufficient to finance  investments through 
risk  capital and debt capital.  In  Italy,  for example, the government 
regulations constituting investment banks were approved only a month 
ago. 
3. Broad presence  of  institutional investors.  In the United States 
there is a type of institutional investor,  the complementary pension 
funds, that because of its method of  collecting savings is able to invest 
significant amounts on the stock market. This circumstance, absent in 
the Italian system, gives the American market great stability and offers 
business a large source of risk capital to finance its investments. An 
important consequence is that it reduces the entire structure of long- 
term interest rates. 
The need to overcome the structural limitations of the Italian capital 
market  has  induced  the  Montedison group;  on the  one  hand,  to 
strengthen the presence of foreign investors in its ownership. Almost 
one-third  of  shares outstanding are owned by foreign operators, in- 
cluding U.S. investors. On the other, the group has listed the shares 
of some group companies on foreign stock exchanges. Erbamont, a 
subholding in  the health  care field, and  Ausimont, a  subholding in 
specialty chemicals, are quoted on the New York Stock Exchange. In 
addition, the shares of the holding company (Montedison S.p.A.) will 
be listed on some European exchanges (Frankfurt, London, Paris, Zu- 
rich) within  a few months. This global financial strategy is also one 
way for diversifying our sources of financing and making our financial 
structure consistent with our production and commercial structures. 
A third reason for the interest of European businessmen in the U.S. 
market comes from its  dimension  and homogeneity. The European 
market as a whole is quite large, but it is segmented and not homo- 
geneous due to  national barriers of a regulatory and institutional nature. 
The chemical market in Europe, for example, in terms of apparent 
dimensions (the subtotal of internal production  plus imports less im- 
ports), is  22 percent larger than that of the United  States and over 
twice that of Japan. What is lacking is homogeneity in the market. The 
physiological need to consider Europe as a single domestic market is 
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divergent-a  fact that has a negative impact on the exchange agreement 
linking European currencies-and  by the differences and complexities 
of national legislation. Let us not forget that completion of the EEC 
internal market is scheduled only for 1992. 
Based in part on these considerations of dimension and homogeneity, 
the Montedison group has taken several initiatives, such as the creation 
of a 50-50 joint  venture with Hercules in the polypropylene field, in 
which Montedison  provided  the technology  and Hercules its  strong 
penetration capacity in a broad  market area. Today Himont, as this 
joint venture is called, controls 22 percent of the world polypropylene 
market. 
The U.S. market, besides being large and homogeneous, has a high 
quality of demand. For a company like Montedison, which is increasing 
the proportion  of  its  high-value-added and  high-tech products, it is 
important to be able to count on an advanced level of consumers. For 
this reason, our production of  Fomblin, a high-performance lubricant 
employed in electronics and aerospace, is sold predominantly  in the 
United States. 
Perhaps having to live with  situations of  instability, a lack of  ho- 
mogeneity, and greater difficulties than in the U.S. system has devel- 
oped in European businessmen an aptitude for internationalization, for 
looking beyond their own borders, for managing situations of uncer- 
tainty with flexible instruments and methods. This “adaptable  men- 
tality” may be useful in the future low- or no-growth economy. It will 
be an important asset when the implementation  of  global strategies 
leads European companies to rapidly exploit opportunities for invest- 
ments and growth in economic systems other than America’s, such as 
in  Japan, for example. The future of  the global European  company 
may include a wider spread of investments among geographic areas. 
It is here that we perhaps find an element of relative weakness in 
the American strategic approach: Compared to the capacity, especially 
Japanese, to compete on the U.S. market, and the keen activity, es- 
pecially European, of monitoring U.S. technology, we find that U.S. 
firms, with the exception of  the multinationals, have difficulty going 
beyond national borders and confronting other realities. With regard 
to the global economy, the Americah  mentality  today  appears “do- 
mestic oriented.” 
I  would  like to recall  one fact concerning the chemical  industry. 
Several European  firms have increased their sales on the American 
market at afuster rate than their overall sales. On the other hand, most 
of the American companies have registered a lower rate of growth in 
European sales than in overall sales. Some U.S. chemical companies 
have greatly reduced their European sales. Keeping in mind that most 
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chemical companies have taken place on U.S. soil, we could deduce 
that the enterprises of the Old Continent have been more skillful than 
their American  competitors at grasping opportunities, at increasing 
technological level, at penetrating  strategic markets. These consider- 
ations seem confirmed by the superior performance of Europe’s chem- 
ical companies with respect to their American counterparts. 
3.  Robert V.  Lindsay 
Direct Investment into the United States 
My observations on direct investment in the United States are those 
of an individual bankerdrawing  on market developments rather than 
depth of research. Given those limitations, I hope I can contribute a 
few points. 
In contemplating a theme for this chapter, I thought one might para- 
phrase res ipsa loquitur, modifying “actions speak for themselves” to 
“markets speak for themselves.”  For the flow of direct investments is 
based on many specific corporate decisions dictated by specific market 
opportunities and by  a supportive market climate.  Broader political 
and economic forces can encourage or deter, but individual corporate 
strategies are paramount. I believe that current market opportunities 
and market conditions are such that direct investments will  grow in 
number, in overall dollar value, and in diversity of origin. 
To  support that conclusion, I review briefly  the earlier pattern of 
U.S.  business expansion abroad; the nature and sources of recent for- 
eign direct investments into this country; the forces at work in the U.S. 
and international  business scenarios that are highly  encouraging  to 
foreign direct investors ; and the financial market environment which 
is equally encouraging. I make a few comments specifically related to 
Japanese direct investment and finally highlight some overall positives 
and negatives from the U.S.  point of view. 
When I arrived in  London in  the early 1970s, U.S. corporate ex- 
pansion abroad was at a peak. From the first establishment or rees- 
tablishment of foreign sales offices and subsidiaries after the Second 
World War, there developed a broader outreach through acquisitions, 
green field manufacturing entities, and marketing organizations. This 
growth was well documented in Robert Lipsey’s paper published in 
this volume. 
Our bank and its counterparts devoted significant people and finan- 
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pursued  a goal of greater market  share in  a rebuilding Europe. We 
worked with them on local financing and on such problems as exchange 
and other controls in the various European centers. Our clients for the 
most part identified their offshore expansion as a discrete and separate 
part of their organizations, and we dealt with a combination of expa- 
triate corporate officers and international specialists in  the corporate 
treasury staffs. 
Fifteen years late, the U.S. direct investment totals continue to grow, 
but from high levels. Mistakes made in the push for overseas market 
share have in many cases been rectified and overseas operations ra- 
tionalized. In effect the U.S. overseas investment process has matured. 
At the same time, the U.S. multinational has integrated its overseas 
investments into the structure and  strategy of the corporate whole. 
Outsourcing, interborder component sales, cross-border financings- 
all  are part  of  an  overall strategic thrust.  As Lipsey  points  out, a 
growing portion of offshore market share for these companies is sup- 
plied  by  their offshore subsidiaries. Their bankers, to compete suc- 
cessfully, must serve the corporate clients on an integrated basis in all 
markets rather than dealing separately with the parts. And the inte- 
grated  corporation  works to  serve its  shareholders rather than  any 
specific national interest. 
To some extent there may be a parallel though more recent pattern 
involved in the development of foreign direct investment into the United 
States. From the  1960s on, a growing number of foreign companies 
with sufficient capital and management talent to expand beyond their 
national or regional areas directed their attention to building market 
share in the United States. This was done primarily by acquisition or 
joint venture rather than through start-ups. As in the case of their U.S. 
counterparts, mistakes were made, particularly but not exclusively in 
the earlier years. Forbes  noted in an issue last July that of the  101 
foreign-owned U.S. companies for which a separate profit and loss 
statement can be  broken  out, 23  operations  lost  $1.3 billion  in  the 
previous fiscal year. However, there have been enough successes of 
sufficient size so that the Morgan Bank, for example, now has a fully 
staffed department of banking officers specifically assigned to servicing 
the U.S. subsidiaries  of  the bank’s offshore corporate clients. That 
department did not exist a decade ago. 
What  distinguishes  the  foreign corporate invasion  from  the U.S. 
expansion abroad is that the process has by no means peaked; if any- 
thing it is gathering momentum. One also has the impression that most 
foreign corporate entities have from the outset devoted their most se- 
nior time and attention to their U.S. strategic moves, reflecting perhaps 
the enormous potential of the U.S. market and their own inherently 
multinational backgrounds. Here again, understandably, corporate self- 
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Who has been coming in from abroad, what have they been buying, 
and at what cost? The figures show that total foreign direct investments 
increased 11 percent in 1985, the last year for which there are complete 
figures, to a total  of $183 billion. Of  the $17.9 billion  net additional 
investment, nearly $12 billion represented equity capital inflows. The 
figures from the first nine months of 1986 indicate a dropoff of nearly 
50 percent in net additional investment, but these figures were impor- 
tantly  affected by  several  repayments of capital  and debts by U.S. 
affiliates to their European parents. 
As to  who is doing the buying, Jeffrey Frankel points out in his paper 
that 66 percent of foreign direct investments at the end of  1985 were 
owned by Europeans. The British and Dutch were by far the largest 
holders within the European totals. Other countries are also impor- 
tant-the  United  Kingdom,  Switzerland, Germany, and Canada to- 
gether accounted for 74 percent of the increase in investment in 1985- 
but the United Kingdom itself doubled its net additional investments 
from $4.3 billion in 1984 to $8.7 billion in 1985. The Japanese presence 
has been much  smaller but  may  grow  apace in  future years. Total 
Japanese investment in the United States nearly tripled from 1980 to 
1985; Business Week reports that MITI expects a  14 percent growth 
annually until the year 2000. As I mention later, the direct investment 
percentage of the Japanese total should itself increase. 
What is being bought? The list runs the gamut from manufacturing 
to natural resources to trade and service industries of all kinds. Food, 
chemicals, and machinery were important in  1985, and several major 
investments in  petroleum  and  oil  services were made. Retail trade, 
banking, other finance and insurance have all been well represented in 
recent years. Real estate is significant in its own right, with represen- 
tation  in  several  categories  as direct investments, portfolio  invest- 
ments, and joint venture start-ups. Clearly whatever is not prohibited 
by statute is fair game, and the fact that an industry is at least tem- 
porarily depressed is no bar to the acquisition orjoint venture process. 
What are the forces at work that give impetus to the flow of direct 
investment into the United States? Some result from the changing world 
economic environment and some relate to U.S. domestic market de- 
velopments within the global environment. 
In the first category we begin with currency relationships. One could 
argue that a falling dollar is discouraging in that existing dollar invest- 
ments fall in  value and the foreign currency value of earnings from 
existing or new investments will be lower. However, those negatives 
are more than offset by the lower capital cost of new investments for 
offshore buyers. America can be bought  on the cheap, as the press 
points out, all the more so when compared to the cost of alternative 
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rates. Another point worth making, even though it cannot be supported 
by hard evidence, is that offshore investors, as we will see, have in- 
creasing means of partial  exchange rate protection  at their disposal; 
however, they are not as concerned with the risks of currency gains 
and losses as their  American  cmnterparts. Europeans in  particular 
tend to take the longer view, having lived with currency fluctuations 
over centuries; the effects of currency gains and losses in the income 
statement are reported as a fact of  doing business rather than a man- 
agement sin. If the underlying market strategy is seen to make sense, 
a currency risk will not outweigh it, unless political risk is also a factor. 
Clearly economic growth in the countries of ultimate ownership have 
helped build  the capital and earning power of acquiring companies. 
The process of both growth and rationalization in postwar Europe has 
resulted in the emergence of strong multinational entities and invest- 
ment pools fully capable of financing and managing sizable U.S. ac- 
quisitions. Some companies in smaller domestic markets like Scandi- 
navia must go offshore to grow, but all are impressed with the necessity 
of a U.S. base for diversification, on both economic and political grounds. 
Differences in labor practices, particularly between the United States 
and Europe, are well known and do not need amplification here. How- 
ever, despite a trend toward a slightly less restrictive labor environment 
in Europe, most notably in England, the gap is seen to be widening in 
favor of the United States as a more flexible place to do business. 
Another characteristic  in the world environment which is unfortunate 
but must be recognized is the lack of alternatives in the world invest- 
ment climate. Businesses measure success by growth; successful busi- 
nesses are not  static by  their nature. In  a  different  world,  Eastern 
Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Asian land mass would provide 
outlets for that growth; as it is, the realistic options have narrowed in 
recent years, making a U.S. investment even more of an imperative. 
The U.S. environment is itself  supportive of direct investment in 
several ways. Our wrenching readjustments in the face of world com- 
petition have resulted in low valuation of some corporate  assets, making 
those assets more likely targets for offshore  acquisition.  Corporate 
restructuring has thrown up divisions or subsidiaries that are unprof- 
itable or outside the strategic thrust of the original owner, but that 
represent a market fit or point of entry for the foreign buyer. Obviously 
interstate competition for new investment has gone well beyond south- 
ern lures to northern manufacturers; the trade mission from Nashville 
is as  likely to  be in Tokyo as in Detroit. Threats of protectionism, either 
through tariffs or quotas, are a more recent spur to a manufacturing 
presence in the U.S. domestic market, outweighing the negatives of 
higher labor costs. In sum the economic trends in the world and in the 
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an environment in which not to have a presence in the United States 
can be seen to represent an undue risk. 
What about financial market developments that are supportive of 
investment from the outside? They are may, and in my view they are 
crucial to the decision process, since they provide at least initial com- 
fort to the decision makers. They make managements and their boards 
of directors  feel better. 
Let’s look at the decision process and how it relates to the market. 
First, it is fair to say that most decisions are taken against a five-year 
time frame. Ten-year forecasts can be drawn as part of strategic plan- 
ning, but only the super confident or  super gutsy will pay much attention 
beyond the fifth year. In the process, strategic options are examined 
and the broader environmental  factors previously mentioned are taken 
into consideration. If as I concluded earlier those point to a presence 
in the United States, one or more of several steps will be taken by a 
potential acquirer. Its existing line organization will be advised to locate 
appropriate U.S. acquisitions through its own sources of information. 
Investment and commercial  bankers will  be apprised of  acquisition 
interests. Consultants may be called upon to abet or confuse the pro- 
cess. A chain of events will be set in motion designed to seek out an 
opportunity or react quickly when an opportunity arises. The inter- 
mediaries not only will arrive in force with screens at the ready; they 
will also include representatives of home-grown financial institutions 
as well as those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other 
key money centers. Everybody is either in or  getting in the M&A game 
these days, and advice and ideas, some good, some bad, will flow in. 
Morgan Guaranty as a case in point not only is represented in all the 
major money centers; it also has 120 research professionals around the 
world maintaining data bases and analytical papers on every important 
industry, jurisdiction by jurisdiction. Clearly, such talents are in place 
to develop business with and stimulate the process of investment by 
potential acquirers. 
Along the line, management will concern itself with financial support 
of the strategic decision. Here is where those innovations discussed in 
Richard Levich’s paper came into play, but frst let me underscore two 
points: (1) the world is awash in money; and (2), it is a near certainty 
that our acquirer’s banks and investment banks have branches or  home 
bases in the United States competing strenuously to finance this piece 
of business.  Management  will be comforted by multilingual liquidity 
and multilingual competition. It will also be comforted, as  well perhaps 
as irritated, by transnational documentation-the  lawyers have not been 
slow to follow their clients from and into the United States, and even 
law firms from as far off as  Australia now have American resident offices 
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As to the innovations so ably documented by Levich, let me simply 
highlight two and mention a third that deserves attention. I pointed out 
that management  primarily  plans within a five-year horizon.  What a 
comfort therefore that long-dated  forward exchange contracts have 
become a commonplace, going in some cases well beyond five years. 
As I said earlier, foreign exchange risks may not drive the decision, 
but partial protection over the medium term puts smiles in the board 
room. If one adds interest rate swaps, commercial paper bridges, and 
other means of minimizing the cost of financing the acquisition, the 
board’s comfort will be limited only by its capacity to understand what 
its financial team is talking about ! Finally, the international equity mar- 
kets are developing an underpinning to  the acquisition process. In 1980 
Morgan had 270 American depositary receipt (ADR) accounts repre- 
senting 244 million  shares. As of this January we had 450 accounts 
representing  1.4 billion  shares. Out of  such statistics flow potential 
liquidity for the American seller and greatly enhanced flexibility  for 
the buyer. Reuters, for example, set up their ADR facility in 1984 and 
used its mechanism in 1985 to acquire Rich Inc. by the issuance of new 
depositary shares. One would assume that British Telecom or British 
Gas will expand via the same process, having incorporated ADRs in 
their initial privatization. 
These are just a few examples to make the point: the markets are 
developing techniques that support the globalization process to the 
same extent that the market makers themselves have become global- 
ized, and as long as the United States is a strategic business target, 
the support systems will push the decision makers in that direction. 
As noted earlier, Japanese investments in the United States are ex- 
pected to grow at a remarkable rate.  Within  that growth, however, 
direct investment will increase proportionately, a point most recently 
made by Michiya Matsukawa of Nikko Securities in the latest paper 
published by the Group of Thirty, and a point reflecting also the ex- 
perience  of  Morgan’s  M&A group in  Tokyo.  A  deterrent has been 
Japanese skepticism about acquisitions-joint  ventures and green field 
start-ups have been preferred. However, protectionist concerns and 
the high cost of doing business in Japan are forcing a reexamination 
of policy on acquisitions and a drive toward better execution, in which 
they have been weak heretofore. Among other things,  for example, 
acquisition strategy requires fast decisions as all those last-minute hur- 
dles appear, a real problem for the Japanese, but one they are addressing. 
The problem for U.S. manufacturing employment going forward may 
be that the Japanese are tending to outsource their manufacturing in 
lower- cost locations elsewhere in Asia and looking to the United States 
for technology and services, notably finance. And with a year-end 1986 
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against $8 billion for J. P.  Morgan, $3.6 billion for Merrill Lynch, and 
$2.7 billion for Chase Manhattan, the prospect of Japanese direct in- 
vestment concentrated in finance is a bit scary, to say the least! There 
is also the potential problem of imbalances in U.S.  real estate ownership 
and valuations,  as Japanese annual purchases of our real estate have 
moved to a $6 billion level in 1986. 
Over and above specific questions relating to the Japanese, there is 
the broader subject  of the impact for better or worse of a growing 
inflow of direct investment in this country. Let me mention a few of 
the positives and negatives, both for U.S.  businesses and for the nation 
as a whole. 
For the American businessman, an important factor in acquisition 
by  a foreign  buyer may be the perception of greater continuing job 
stability for the selling management and staff, since there is less like- 
lihood of duplication of experience and local knowledge. The ability 
to move ahead without fear of being swallowed by domestic compet- 
itors is a corollary plus, an example being the acquisition by  Allied 
Irish Banks of a major interest in the First National Bank of Maryland, 
leaving the latter intact and with a substantial infusion of capital. There 
are similarities in the Sumitomo investment in Goldman Sachs. Also, 
a foreign acquirer can offer its U.S. target a built-in  expansion into 
foreign  markets-a  quick  widening  of  business horizons. Negatives 
include the obvious problem of differing business cultures and the flip 
side of the management picture, that is, the good younger American 
executive may see promotion to the upper ranks of the parent as un- 
likely, if  not impossible. This is a real problem for the Japanese, but 
also for more compatible  cultures such as Scandinavia,  where high 
personal  taxation is a major deterrent to influx  of otherwise mobile 
American managers. There is no one answer to these questions. As a 
general rule, if  the underlying transaction made sense, the positives 
will outweigh the negatives in the glow of subsequent success. 
The nation as a whole should benefit from infusions of capital and 
business brainpower, capital that by its nature will be more stable than 
the massive offshore holdings of liquid assets (although parenthetically, 
when concerns are expressed about foreign investors pulling  out of 
their U.S. holdings, I am more inclined to think, as Martin Feldstein 
does, of satiation rather than outright withdrawal). A negative, apart 
from the political concerns of loss of control of our economic destiny- 
somewhat farfetched at this point-is  pointed out in Jeffrey Frankel’s 
paper: earnings on direct investment tend to be greater than interest 
earned on bonds, and to that extent the underlying current account 
problem is worsened. Also, as pointed out earlier, multinational self- 
interests will prevail and may run a political collision course with per- 
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I conclude by repeating the original theme-the  markets speak for 
themselves, and at the moment they tell us that most signals are go for 
direct investment, including accumulations of offshore capital, attrac- 
tion to the United  States as a market, and a highly accommodative 
acquisition environment for corporate decision takers. I see little on 
the horizon likely to change that market consensus. 
Summary of  Discussion 
Several participants  commented  on  the  consequences  of  direct  in- 
vestment for trade. Thomas Enders recalled that when U.S. multina- 
tionals  went  abroad, exports, through  sales to subsidiaries, for ex- 
ample,  followed.  Later,  there  may  have  been  a  reverse  flow,  he 
suggested. Robert Lindsay argued that direct investment is not a sub- 
stitute for firm or country exports but is rather an effort to hold onto 
or expand foreign markets.  The Swedish investments  here, for ex- 
ample, expanded Swedish exports to the United States. 
On a different topic, Lionel Olmer expressed some doubt that the 
EEC internal market would be complete by 1992, and Mario Schimberni 
conceded that there was some doubt that this target was achievable; 
he noted that he was doing everything he could to help, but suggested 
that unification will require great political leadership. 
There was some discussion of the reasonableness of the scenario in 
which foreign investors in the United States lose confidence in their 
U.  S. securities and shift their portfolios quickly overseas, precipitating 
a crisis. Schimberni accepted the possibility that foreign investors might 
desire eventually to stop the huge inflow of foreign flows, but he won- 
dered if there were markets anywhere else with the depth and breadth 
of U.S. markets.  Olmer agreed that a sudden collapse was unlikely 
because the only possibility is the gradual acceptance of the mark and 
the yen as reerve currencies.  Schimberni contended that the macro- 
economic climate of  low inflation and uncertain growth in Germany 
and Italy is not conducive to their absorption of capital that had rejected 
the United States. 
Rachel McCulloch opened a discussion on strategies for direct in- 
vestment by noting that U.S.  companies abroad tend to like wholly 
owned subsidiaries, while foreigners in the United States avail them- 
selves of  a  range  of  options.  She wondered  whether  this  could  be 
explained by differences between the types of  firms. Lindsay consid- 
ered  that  the  desire of  U.S.  firms to hold  onto their  technological 
advantage and of foreign firms to acquire technology could explain the 
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Schimberni predicted two basic changes in direct investment. First, 
the slow rate of overall growth implies that businesses should avoid 
overcapacity and the resulting competition. Second, the acceleration 
of the timing of technical change means that a new discovery does not 
last long and the product cycle is short. The reduction in the number 
of actors and the bigger critical mass required for the larger amounts 
of research and development necessary imply that Americans will have 
to consider partnerships and joint ventures too. In fact some American 
firms, such as Dupont, already are, which was unheard of five years 
ago. 
Peter Peterson proposed that the trend was toward the global ra- 
tionalization of the business, not as a U.S. firm with several subsid- 
iaries, for example, but as one global profit center. This makes partial 
ownership awkward. Robert Ingersoll agreed that partnership and glob- 
alization of production and marketing are not compatible. Charles Parry 
said that Alcoa has not seen this coordination problem, although he 
remarked that IBM has had difficulties with cross-border transport of 
components. He observed a problem for the national interest in the 
possibly conflicting desires to preserve national technological leads and 
to optimize the location of  manufacturing. 
The issue goes beyond ownership integration to management itegra- 
tion, pointed out Bruce Atwater. In the 1950s and 1960s the European 
subsidiaries of U.S. companies primarily were run by American man- 
agers. Now most European subsidiaries are run by national managers, 
and the issue has moved to internationalizing parent-company man- 
agement. George Voita suggeted that the early stages of direct invest- 
ment involve the acquisition of technology or markets and hence imply 
subsidiary arrangements, while the more mature stage, where foreign 
direct investment in the United States may be in ten or fifteen years, 
involves a more global structure and management. 
Schimberni argued that the joint venture may have some advantages 
from a cultural point of view, The difference  in organizations might 
reflect a difference in management  styles, not a more primitive stage 
of investment. The flexibility  of European firms comes from the ne- 
cessity to be international in orientation. The management must fit the 
community. IBM, for example, suffers in Japan because it is wholly 
owned and has partly American managers. To  successfully penetrate 
Japanese markets will require joint ventures and a long-term point of 
view. His firm’s joint venture with Hercules, a fifty-fifty proposition, 
would not have been more successful as a wholly owned subsidiary. 